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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah

MERLENE LODDERJ
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
7809

WESTERN PAC IF I C RAILROAD
COMPANY and RICHARD WHITE,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent and her husband William Lodder commenced this action against The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company and the appellants to recover
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damages sustained in an automobile-locomotive collision
which occurred at the intersection of 2nd South and 4th
West Streets in Salt Lake City (Ro 1-2) o The complaint is in
the form approved by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for
situations where the plaintiff is unable to determine definitely whether "CD or EF is responsible or whether both are
responsible" (Form 10) and accordingly alleges that one or
the other of the three named defendants or any one of three
different combinations of the defendants negligently moved
the locomotive into the intersection and against the automobile of the plaintiff William Lodder, which he was driving
and in which the plaintiff Merlene Lodder was "present"
(Ro 1) o Plaintiff William Lodder prayed for a judgment for
the damage to his automobile and the plaintiff Merlene
Lodder prayed for judgment for her special damages and
$5,000o00 general damages (Ro 2)
0

Later the plaintiffs filed an amended and supplemental
complaint in which the Salt Lake City Union Depot and
Railroad Company was added as a party defendant (R. 25).
The allegations of negligence in the original complaint were
repeated, as were the allegations describing the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff Merlene Lodder (R. 25). With
respect to the added defendant, it was charged with negligence in having maintained and employed a watchman at the
crossing between certain hours for a period of four months
before the accident occurred; that the plaintiffs had, during
:this period, used the crossing frequently during the hours
the watchman was on duty and were thereby lead to believe that the crossing would be protected by the watchman and that a warning would be given of the approach of
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trains to the intersection; that on the night of the collision
the watchman negligently failed and neglected to warn the
plaintiffs of the approach of the locomotive to the crossing.
The plaintiff Merlene Lodder alleged that as a result of
her injuries she had been damaged in the sum of $50,000.00,
plus special damages ( R. 25-28) . A few minutes before
the time set for the trial the plaintiff William Lodder moved
to dismiss his complaint without prejudice, which motion
was granted (R. 44).
The action was tried to a jury and at the close of the
evidence the defendants separately moved for a directed
verdict (R. 30-43). The motion for the defendant Salt Lake
Union Depot Company was granted (R. 46). No ruling was
made on the motions of the other defendants. Although all
parties requested that the jury return a general verdict, the
court of its own motion directed the jury to return a special
verdict ( R. 353) . The jury answered some of the questions
submitted to them in the affirmative and some in the negative (R. 353-6). Immediately upon return of the special
verdict the court directed the jury to again retire and asses's
the amount of damages. The jury assessed the damage in
the sum of $25,000 (R. 351-2).
The defendants, other than the Depot Company, then
filed separate motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and in the alternative for a new trial (R. 362-3) .
The motion of the defendant The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict was granted (R. 359). The motions of the appellants for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were
denied, but a new trial, limited to the issue of injury and
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damage, was granted unless the plaintiff remitted the sum
of $15,000 from the judgment (R. 364). The plaintiff accepted the reduction (R. 366).
The collision occurred at about 9 :15 P.M. December 19,
1949.
Second South Street extends east and west and intersects Fourth West Street at right angles (Ex. A).
These streets are each 132 feet wide (Ex. A). Four
sets of railroad tracks laid in Fourth West Street intersect Second South Street (Ex. A). The most easterly track
crosses Second South Street at an angle of 15 degrees and
is referred to in the evidence as Track No. 1 (Ex. A). It
branches off from the next westerly track at a switch,
which is 55 feet north of Second South (Ex. A). Approximately 170 feet north of Second South is another switch
leading to Track No. 1 (Ex. A). The intersection is lighted
by two street lights, one located at the northwest corner and
the other at the southeast corner (Ex. A).
The Diesel locomotive operated by the appellant White,
assisted by hostler helper Bond, was brought from the
roundhouse to a point near First South Street, where it was
backed in on Track No. 1 and brought to a stop at the third
switch north of Second South (R. 188-191). At this point
the hostler received a signal from the crossing watchman,
who was then in the intersection of Second South and Fourth
West (R. 191). Bond lined the switch, gave the hostler a
back-up signal and got on the stirrup located at the rear on
the left side of the locomotive (R. 231). The locomotive approached the crossing at a rate of speed of about five or six
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miles per hour (R. 198). When the rear of the locomotive
reached a point a few feet north of the north line of Second
South, Bond looked to the east and saw the plaintiffs' automobile approaching (R. 233). He estimated that the automobile was then about 200 feet east of the track on which
the locomotive was moving (R. 233). When he first saw
the automobile he realized that it would be unable to stop
before reaching the railroad track, and, accordingly, jumped
off the locomotive and gave the hostler an emergency stop
signal (R. 233). The hostler had observed his helper jump
off the locomotive and realized that some accident was imminent (R. 195). He applied the independent brakes on
the locomotive as Bond jumped off and made an emergency
application of the brakes immediately upon receiving the
emergency signal (R. 195).
Bond's first apprehension of a collision proved correct.
Lodder said that he saw the locomotive when his automobile
was about five or six car lengths (15 feet each) from the
track, that he immediately shifted into second gear and
applied his brakes (R. 84-9). This application of the brakes
locked the wheels and the car skidded or slid on the icy
street and struck the rear of the locomotive at the point of
the stirrup on which Bond had very recently been riding (R.
84-93) . The point of collision was 30 feet south of the north
curb line of Second South (R. 252). The locomotive moved
61 feet and the automobile 36 feet, both in the same direction, after the impact (R. 252). The automobile was badly
damaged and plaintiff received an injury when her head
struck the windshield of the auto.
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POINTS RELIED ON BY APPELLANTS
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
PROVE ANY ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE ON
THE PART OF EITHER OF THE APPE~
LANTS.
POINT II
THE SPECIAL VERDICT IS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
THE PLAINTIFF.
POINT III
NO FINDING IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT CAN BE IMPLIED.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON THAT ISSUE AS REQUESTED
BY THE DEFENDANTS.
POINT V
IT IS ERROR TO INSTRUCT THE JURY UPON
PROPOSITIONS OF LAW NOT APPLIED OR
APPLICABLE TO THE ISSUES AND EVIDENCE EVEN THOUGH THE PROPOSITIONS
ARE CORRECTLY STATED.
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POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE
JURY ISSUES UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
POINT VII
THE DEFENDANTS WERE PREVENTED
FROM HAVING A FAIR TRIAL BY THE
COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT THEIR
COUNSEL TO ADDRESS THE JURY AFTER
THE SECOND SUBMISSION OF THE CASE.
POINT VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT SETTING ASIDE THE ENTIRE
VERDICT AS TAINTED BY PASSION AND
PREJUDICE AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS
A NEW TRIAL.

POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
PROVE ANY ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE ON
THE PART OF EITHER OF THE APPELLANTS.
The defendants made demand upon the plaintiffs in
the form of written interrogatories for a bill of particulars
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of the negligence which plaintiffs claimed each defendant
was guilty of (R. 7-8). In response thereto, plaintiffs stated
under oath that the defendant Richard White was the
engineer in charge of the backward movement of the Diesel
locomotive and in the course of his employment (1) failed
to look and observe in the direction the locomotive was moving so as to apprehend the approach of the plaintiff's automobile and to take reasonable precautions to avoid the
collision which could have been avoided if he had kept a
proper lookout as the locomotive approached the intersection, (2) failed to cause the bell of the locomotive to be
rung as it approached the intersection, (3) failed to cause
the whistle or horn of the locomotive to be sounded, (4)
failed to cause the rear light of the locomotive to be lighted
so as to shine in the direction the locomotive was proceeding, notwithstanding it was dark and snow was falling, and
( 5) that the defendant railroad companies employed a
crossing watchman who failed to proceed into the intersection with a lighted lantern or otherwise and thus to warn
approaching motorists, including the plaintiffs, of the
presence of the locomotive and its movement into the intersection (R. 9-13). The bill of particulars further stated
that if Richard White had maintained a proper lookout and
thereafter exercised reasonable control of the locomotive
he could have observed the approach of plaintiff's automobile and slowed or stopped the backward movement of
the locomotive so as to have avoided the collision with the
automobile (R. 11-12).
It will be observed that the bill of particulars does not

charge the defendants with any negligent acts or conduct
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9
other than the acts and omissions of the engineer and the
crossing watchman, and further that the plaintiffs do not
claim or assert that either of the railroads or their servants
failed or neglected to give any signal or warning required
by any statute or ordinance.
ALLEGED FAILURE TO KEEP A LOOKOUT
The railroad track on which the locomotive was backing crosses Second South at an angle of 15 degrees east of
north and south. It extends north of Second South at this
angle a distance of approximately 170 feet, although it begins to curve slightly to the west after a point about 60
feet north of Second South (Ex. A) . A two-story brick
building is located on the northeast corner of the intersection. The southwest corner of this building is 20 feet from
the north curb line of Second South and 42 feet east of the
center of the tracks on which the locomotive was backing.
The intersection is lighted by street lights located on the
northwest and southeast corners. The Diesel locomotive consists of three units, their overall length being about 120
feet (R. 183) . It is about 15 feet high (R. 183) .
It was necessary to back the locomotiv~ down Fourth
West Street in order to attach it in the proper position to
the Western Pacific train which was destined to go west (R.
188). The locomotive started its backward movement from
a point near First South (R. 189). The hostler helper, Bond,
who was acting as switchman, got off the engine to check
the switch (R. 190). He then gave White the backup signal
(R. 143). White operated the locomotive from his seat on
the right-hand side of the cab (R. 190). He kept a lookout
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in the direction the engine was backing by leaning out the
window and turning his head (R. 190). Because of his
position in the cab of the locomotive and the location of the
building on the northeast corner of the intersection, it was
not possible for White to see an automobile approaching
from the east until it was practically to the intersection.
He saw the automobile for the first time when it was about .
20 feet east of the tracks (R. 194). The back of the locomotive was then out into Second South (R. 194). However,
he had observed Bond jump off the locomotive before he saw
the automobile (R. 195). Bond had boarded the locomotive
when it was approximately 170 feet north of Second South
(R. 240). He maintained his position on the locomotive by
standing in the stirrup and grasping the handhold with his
right hand (R. 244). He held his lighted lantern in his left
hand (R. 244). He estimated that the automobile was 200
feet east of the tracks when he first observed it (R. 233).
At that time the rear of the locomotive was about at the
switch nearest Second South (R. 243). Before the rear of
the locomotive reached this point Bond had no view of automobiles approaching from the east (R. 245). The moment
he saw the automobile he realized that it would be unable to
stop before reaching the tracks ( R. 233) . He immediately
jumped off and gave the engineer an emergency stop signal
(R. 233). The rear of the locomotive was then just a few
feet north of the north curb line of Second South (R. 234).
The engineer responded immediately to the emergency signal
(R. 235). He applied the brakes as soon as Bond jumped
off.
The locomotive traveled about 50 feet from the time
Bond jumped off until the automobile collided with it (R.
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246). The locomotive was brought to a complete stop with
the rear end just about on the south sidewalk of Second
South (R. 250).
We ignore the omission in the pleadings of any charge
that the defendant Western Pacific Railroad Company failed to maintain a proper lookout for the automobile. It is
submitted that there is a complete failure to prove that
either of the appellants neglected to maintain a reasonable
lookout for the automobile in which the respondent was
riding. Bond was stationed on the rear end of the locomotive continuously for at least 170 feet until he jumped
off in order to avoid serious injury. He did not ·jump
off until the locomotive was practically into the intersection.
He observed the automobile at the first opportunity that it
could be observed by a person riding on the stirrup of the
locomotive. White, of course, was in no position to keep a
lookout for automobiles approaching the intersection from
either direction. The railroad did not rely upon White to
keep a lookout. It stationed Bond on the rear end of the
locomotive. where he would be in the best possible posit~ on
to keep a lookout as the locomotive came into the intersection.
The testimony of White and Bond with respect to lookout for plaintiff's automobile is uncontradicted. It demonstrates that the best possible lookout under the circumstances
was maintained and that the automobile w~s actually seen
as soon as the physical conditions at the crossing permitted.
In the case of Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company, ... Utah ... , 186 P. (2d) 293, the evidence with
respect to an alleged failure of a train crew to keep a look-
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out for automobiles approaching a public crossing was quite
similar to the evidence in the case at bar except that in the
Van Wagoner case there was some evidence that the car
stalled momentarily on the crossing before it was struck by
the train. This court held that the evidence was insufficient
as a matter of law to establish a failure to maintain a reasonable lookout.
Furthermore, as pointed out in the Van Wagoner case:
"Even were we to assume the train crew failed
to keep a proper lookout, appellants must still fail
in their assignment, as assuming the truck was stalled for a couple of seconds, if it is intended to submit
this question to the jury, there must be a basis for
concluding that the failure to keep a lookout proximately contributed to the accident * * * "
ALLEGED LAST CLEAR CHANCE
In order to establish a causal connection between a
falure to keep a lookout for the plaintiff's automobile and
the accident, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove
that the train crew had a clear opportunity by the exercise
of reasonable care to avoid the collision after they saw or
should have seen that the driver was in a situation in which
he would be unable to stop the automobile short of the track.
No such evidence was produced. On the contrary, the uncontroverted facts are that the train crew exercised the highest degree of care to avoid the collision after they saw or
could possibly have seen that the driver was in a situation
in which it was impossible for him to stop.
As has already been pointed out, Bond saw the automobile as soon as it was possible in his position to see it. He
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had assumed the most advantageous position possible on the
locomotive to maintain a lookout for automobiles approaching from the east. Unquestionably, the driver was in a
position of peril when Bond first observed the automobile.
It was then skidding and completely out of control, Bond
instantly realized that it would be unable to stop before
reaching the tracks. He immediately jumped off the locomotive and gave an emergency stop signal to the engineer.
The latter had anticipated the emergency signal and applied
the independent brakes as soon as Bond jumped off. The
application of the emergency brake automatically applied
sand to the rails, and the locomotive was brought to a stop
before it had cleared the crossing. There is not even an intimation in the evidence that this locomotive could have been
stopped in any shorter distance than it was stopped. _There
was not the slightest delay on the part of Bond in signaling
the engineer to stop after he saw the approaching automobile. He did not give an ordinary stop signal, but called
for an emergency stop. There was not the slightest delay
on the part of the engineer in responding to the stop signal.
In fact, he started to stop the locomotive the moment he saw
Bond jump off.
It may be that the !rain crew did not give any signal

to the driver after they discovered or should have discovered
the perilous situation in which he had placed himself. Obviously, no signal of any kind from the train crew at that
time could possibly have enabled him to avoid the collision.
At that time he had lost all control over his vehicle and
nothing but an immovable object could have prevented him
from reaching the tracks.
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The allegations in the bill of particulars to the effect
that the train crew failed to keep a reasonable lookout and
failed to exercise reasonable care to stop the locomotive after
a reasonable lookout would have disclosed the inability of
the driver of the automobile to stop is an attempt to invoke what is referred to commonly as the last clear chance
doctrine.
This court has already pointed out that the doctrine
of last clear chance is seldom, if ever; applicable in a crossing
case. See Holmgren v. Union Pac. R. Co., ... Utah ... , 198
P. (2d) 459. In the case cited the facts necessary to be established by the plaintiff in order to invoke the last clear
chance proposition are stated thus at page 463 of the Pacific
citation:
"This court has more than once cited with approval the rul~ of last clear chance stated in the
American Law Institute Restatement of Torts, Sec.
480, which reads as follows:
"'A plaintiff who by the exercise of reasonable
vigilance could have observed the danger created by
the defendant's negligence in time to have avoided
harm therefrom, may recover if, but only if, the defendant
" '(a) knew of the plaintiff's situation;
" '(b) realized or had reason to realize that
the plaintiff was inattentive and therefore unlikely
to discover his peril in time to· avoid the harm, and
"' (c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then
existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff.'
(Italics added.)
"In amplification of this rule, and particularly
subparagraph (b) thereof, we have said that 'to
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hold the defendant liable it must plainly appear to the
jury that defendant knew or reasonably should have
known of plaintiff's * * * inattention and
after such realization or after he reasonably, had he
been conducting himself with the vigilance required
of him, should have known it, "is negligent in failing
to utilize with reasonable care and competence his
then existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff." In the clear chance doctrine the plaintiff's
negligence has become in a sense fixed and realizable
and on to this state of things defendant approaches
on to the negligent plaintiff with and in control of
the danger.' Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 166
P. 2d 230, 235, 236."
and in the case of Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R. Co.,
... Utah .. , 186 P. (2d) 293, at page 302 of the Pacific
citation:
"The engineer or other members of the train
crew could assume the deceased would stop until he
was so close to the track that a reasonable person
would know otherwise. Undoubtedly when deceased
cleared the one tree some 20 feet from the crossing,
it would be apparent that he did not intend to stop.
Disregarding the testimony of two members of the
crew that when they did see the truck clear this tree
they gave the emergency signal, appellants' evidence
only permits one or two seconds for the train crew
to have taken the necessary steps to have prevented
the accident. This is not giving the defendant the
last clear chance. The opportunty to avoid the accident must not be a possibility; it must be a clear
opportunity. Not even by speculation could the jury
reach a verdict on the theory that the train crew had
time to appreciate that deceased was negligent and
that by reasonable means they could have avoided
the ensuing collision. When, as in this iurisdiction,
a train has the preferred right of way, its operator
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is entitled to assume the driver of a car will yield to
this preferment, and if the doctrine of last clear
lchance is to be invoked, it must clearly appear that
time permitted the train crew to appreciate deceased's predicament, and to give warnings sufficiently early enough for the deceased to extricate
himself, or the time element was sufficient to permit
the crew to bring the train to a stop. No such showing was made here."
These decisions preclude any contention in this case
that the railroad employees had a clear chance to avoid the
collision by the exercise of reasonable care after they should
have seen the plaintiffs' automobile in a situation of peril.
The train crew saw the automobile as soon as it could have
been seen. There is no conflict in the evidence as to this fact.
There was, therefore, as a matter of law, no failure to
maintain a reasonable lookout for the plaintiffs' automobile.
It is likewise undisputed that the train crew did everything
humanly possible to avoid the collision after they first became aware that the automobile would be unable to stop.
The facts in this case with respect to last clear chance are
far less favorable to the plaintiff than those in either the
Holmgren or the Van Wagoner cases. In each of these cases
it is held as a matter of law that the railroad had no clear opportunity to avoid the collision after becoming aware of the
negligence of the motorist. No different conclusion could
reasonably be reached in the case at bar.
ALLEGED FAILURE TO GIVE WARNING OF
APPROACH OF LOCOMOTIVE.
The jury found against the plaintiff upon the issue of
the ringing of the bell and the operation of the lights on the
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rear of the locomotive. In any event, the evidence was undisputed that the bell was ringing and the backup light
functioning throughout the entire backing movement of the
locomotive.
With respect to the blowing of the whistle or horn on
the locomotive, the testimony of White was to the effect that
the cords by which the horn is operated are just above the
engineer's seat in the cab of the locomotive; that when the
locomotive stopped at the second switch north of Second
South he blew the whistle in recognition of a signal which he
had received from the crossing watchman. Bond testified
that the horn was sounded when the locomotive was approaching the first switch north of Second South and that
it was loud enough to be heard for a half mile. Hilton, who
was standing on the platform of the depot on Third West,
heard the horn of the locomotive when it was about half
way between First and Second South (R. 289). The plaintiff and her husband each testified that they did not hear
any whistle from the locomotive.
With respect to the crossing watchman, the plaintiff
and her husband stated that they did not see any signal given
by him. The plaintiff's husband says he did not see anybody in the intersection as the automobile approached (R.
70). The plaintiff testified that she did not see the watchman before the collision but did see a red light, near the
watchman's shanty (R. 156) . This shanty is located between
the second and third tracks a few feet to the south of the
south line of Second South Street (R. 157). She placed the
red light about on the crosswalk north of the watchman's
shanty (R. 157). The watchman testified that he was on
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duty at the crossing at the time of the collision and was
equipped with a lantern by which he could give signals to
train operators and motorists by either a white or a red
light ( R. 255-6) .
While sitting in the shanty he observed the locomotive
stop up by the third switch. He went out and signaled the
hostler that the switches were lined (R. 261). He then returned to the shanty, called the stationmaster on the
"dummy" telephone and then with his lantern showing the
red light walked toward the center of the street. He observed
the auto when it was about two-thirds of a block east ·of
Fourth West. He signaled to the automobile and continued to
do so until just before the collision occurred. He was standing in the center of Second South Street at the time the
automobile struck the locomotive (R. 281).
We shall assume for the time being and for sake of
argument that a jury could properly find from the evidence
above recited that the defendants in the exercise of reasonable care should have given some warning in addition to
that established by the special verdict and the uncontradicted evidence, and that the trainmen failed to give such
additional warning. Our contention is that the failure to
give some additional warning of the approach of the locomotive was not a proximate cause of the collision. We
further contend that proximate cause of the collision was
the negligence of the driver of the automobile in which the
plaintiff was riding, which negligence consisted of approaching the railroad track at an unlawful and unreasonable rate
of speed under the conditions .
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The uncontroverted evidence establishes that the driver of the automobile in which the resopndent was riding
approached the crossing at an unlawful and negligent rate
of speed. He knew the exact location of the railroad tracks
and was familiar with the character and condition of the
crossing. He knew that he was approaching a place of
danger and that engines and trains passed over the crossing
at all hours of the day and night. He also knew that the
street on which he was driving was covered with snow and
ice and in an extremely slippery condition. Notwithstanding
this knowledge and appreciation of these conditions he approached the tracks at a rate of speed which he could not
reduce to any appreciable degree. The moment he attempted
to accomplish such reduction of speed the automobile went
completely out of his control. Although the brakes were in
good condition and the rear tires equipped with chains, the
car slid on the snow and ice a distance of 60 feet before crashing into the locomotive. Had it not struck an immovwble object it would have continued on its course indefinitely until
its momentum was expended. It did not stop even when
it struck the locomotive. It continued in another direction
for an additional distance of 36 feet. From the moment the
~rakes were applied until the automobile finally came to
rest the driver had no more control over its movement than
he would have had if he had been sitting at home.
Section 57-7-113, U. C. A. 1943, provides that no person
shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than
is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having
regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing.
The above section also provides that the driver of every
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vehicle shall drive at an appropriate reduced speed when
approaching rail grade crossings. A violation of this statute
is a misdemeanor. See Section 57-7-80. A similar statute
has been construed by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
in a crossing case as follows:
"The plaintiff was bound by the express command of the statute, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, § 15, as
amended by St. 1933, c. 26, § 1, to reduce his speed to
a proper rate and to proceed cautiously over the
crossing. The purpose of reducing the speed is to
afford the operator such control of the vehicle as will
enable him to avert any danger that he might encounter on his journey over the crossing. But the
purpose and words of the statute are not complied
with by a mere reduction of speed. There must be
caution commensurate with the perils that are universally recognized as lurking in a place where a
railroad crosses a public way at grade."
See Papageorge v. Boston & M. R. R. Co., 57 N. E.
(2d) 576, . . . Mass. . ...
In approaching the crossing in the manner and under
the conditions above set forth respondent's husband violated
both sections of the statute. He drove his automobile at a
speed greater than reasonable and prudent in view of the
conditions of the street and the proximity of the railroad
crossing. He did not approach this crossing at an appropriate reduced speed because having violated the first provisions of the statute he was unable to reduce the speed as
required by the second provisions of the statute.
Even if there were no statute making such operation
of an automobile unlawful, the common law would condemn
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it as a negligent operation. In Lynch v. Pa. Railroad Company, 194 N. E. 31, 48 Ohio Appeal 295, a motorist approached a railroad crossing over a strip of highway which
had recently been oiled and was therefore in a slippery condition. This strip of oiled road extended 600 feet from the
railroad tracks. When the motorist reached a point 25
feet from the railroad tracks he applied the brakes. The
automobile immediately began to slide and continued to
do so until it struck the side of the locomotive about to
cross the highway. The court held that the driver was
negligent as a matter of law.
"It is to-day a matter of common knowledge
that the presence of oil, such as is usually placed upon
streets, makes them extremely slippery. It is very
difficult to bring vehicles to a stop. They will skid
and slide very easily. A condition of the street which
is so obvious requires that a vehicle operated upon a
street so oiled must be under perfect control. To
drive an automobile up to a railroad crossing over
which a locomotive or train may be caused to pass
at any moment, at what would be a safe rate of
speed when the street was dry, may be sheer madness
when the street is covered with oil up to the crossing.
It is clear that decedent made no effort to stop the
automobile until within 25 feet of the crossing,
and that he was then unable to stop, owing to the
condition of the street.

See:

Carlin v. Thompson, 12 N. W. (2d) 224, 234
Iowa 469;
Davis v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 216 N. W.
424, 241 Mich. 166;
Boyle v. Lehi Valley Transit Co., 27 A. (2d)
682, 150 Pa. Sup. 86.
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It being established that the driver of the automobile

in which the respondent wa~ riding approached the cros~ing
at an unreasonable and unlawful rate of speed, it becomes
a matter of pure speculation whether some additional warning would have enabled him to stop before reaching the track.
It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to present some factual
basis for a conclusion that some additional warning of the
movement of the locomotive toward the crossing would have
enabled the driver to avoid the collision. She produced no
such evidence.
Plaintiff made no attempt to show in what distance
the automobile could have been stopped short of the railroad track at the rate of speed it was moving or at any
other rate of speed. It is, therefore, impossible to say that
some additional warning from. the train crew would have
enabled the driver to stop before the collision.
The driver admits that he saw the locomotive when
his automobile was approximately 80 feet from the tracks.
He actually saw it sooner because he shifted the gears
before applying the brakes and losing control of his vehicle.
The moment he attempted to reduce the speed of the automobile he lost all control of it. There just isn't any effective warning that can be given to a motorist who approaches
a crossing at a rate of speed which renders it impossible
for him to control the movement of a vehicle. It is even
conjectural whether some additional warning would have
prevented the driver from becoming negligent and it is
certainly entirely speculative whether additional warning
would have enabled him to avoid the collision.
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It is legally impossible to combine or unite the negli-

gence of the driver of the automobile with any failure of
the railroad to give additional warning of the approach of
the locomotive to form the legal or proximate cause of the
collision. There is no connection between them. The negligence of the driver is the dynamic, efficient and direct
cause, and, therefore, the proximate cause of the collision.
The assumed insufficiency of warning by the railroad is a
remote, disconnected and wholly speculative cause and~
therefore, not a legal cause of any kind. These conclusions
are established by numerous authorities.

Lavallee v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 89 N. H. 323,
197 A. 816, was an action by a guest riding in a truck that
was struck by a railroad train at a public crossing. The
highway on which the truck was moving descended slightly
toward the railroad tracks and was extremely icy and
slippery. When the truck reached a point about 125 feet
from the tracks the driver saw the approaching train
which was then about 700 feet from the highway. The
driver immediately applied his brakes and the truck skidded approximately 100 feet onto the tracks. When the
brakes were applied the truck was traveling 12 to 14 miles
per hour, but that speed was reduced to about four or five
miles per hour before the impact. The train was moving
about 25 or 30 miles per hour. There was evidence that
the statutory warning signals were not given by the train
crew.
The contention of the plaintiff that the driver would
have stopped or reduced his speed before losing control .of
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the truck was answered by pointing out that it was purely
conjectural whether he would have done so. The court said:
"It may be argued, however, that if the statutory signals had been given, and had been heard
by the driver, he would have stopped before reaching the crest of the grade. The answer is that the
burden was upon the plaintiff to prove the causal
connection between the negligence complained of and
the collision, and the case is bare of evidence upon
which to base a conclusion that the conduct of the
truck driver would have been different if he ·had
received earlier notice of the train's approach. He
made no such claim in his testimony, and the probabilities are all against it.
"Assuming that the speed of the train was 30
miles per hour, a simple mathematical calculation
indicates that if the whistle had been blown at the
whistling post 1,320 feet from the crossing, this
would have been 13 seconds before the driver in fact
saw the train 700 feet from the crossing. It follows
that the truck, proceeding at a speed of 12 to 14 miles
per hour, would then have been from 216 to 250 feet
from the crest of the grade. The evidence clearly
indicates that at this distance the train would not
have been visible. Whether the crossing would have
been in sight is problematical. It could not reasonably be inferred that if the truck driver had then
heard a whistle he would at once· have stopped his
truck in order to avoid a collision with a train, which
was then invisible, upon a crossing approximately
350 feet away. There is nothing in common experience to justify such a conclusion. On the contrary,
it is generally known that truck drivers do not act
that way.
"If it be argued that the speed of the truck
might have been reduced before reaching the crest of
the grade, the answer is that there is no more basis
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in the evidence for this inference than for the one
last considered. In regard to the speed of the truck,
the driver testified upon direct examination as follows:
" 'Q. When you reached this point '(indicating on plan), when you applied your brakes,
and saw the train coming, and you applied your
brakes, you were proceeding along the River
Road here (indicating on plan), how fast do you
say your truck was going, when you ,applied
your brakes? A. Around twelve to fourteen
miles.
" 'Q. \Vhy was it going such a slow speed?
A. Because of danger.
"'Q. The danger was what? A. Ice.'
"Having thus prepared for the danger incident
to the icy condition of the road, which, as he later
testified 'brought a:bout the accident, there is no
reason to infer that he would have made additional
preparation for meeting the train by a further reduction in speed, at a distance of over 20 rods from
the crossing, if he had then heard a whistle.
"We therefore conclude that the present record
contains no evidence upon which it could be found
that the accident was caused by the defendant's failure to give the statutory crossing signals. A similar conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court
of Iowa in a case having many points of similarity
to that before us. Barrett v. United States Railroad
Administration, 196 Iowa 1143, 194 N. W. 222."
In Umlauft v. C., M. & St. P. R. R., 289 N. W. 623, 233
Wis. 29_1, the plaintiff, August, was driving an automobile
belonging to Paul. It ran into a train at a public crossing.
August brought suit to recover damages for personal injuries and Paul brought suit to recover damages to the
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automobile. The cases were tried together. The jury found
that August approached the crossing at a negligent_ rate of
speed and that this negligence was a proximate cause of
the collision. The jury also found that the train was moving
at an unlawful rate of speed and that this negligence was
a proximate ·cause of the collision. The evidence disclosed that August had no view of the approaching train
until his automobile reached a point 100 feet from the railroad track. At that point he attempted to stop but the
automobile skidded along the slippery street a distance of
75 feet before colliding with the second car of the train
which was moving 40 miles per hour. It was the contention
of the plaintiffs that if the train had been going at a reasonable rate of speed the automobile would have skidded
across the tracks in clear of the train. The court held that
the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of
the driver of the automobile and that the speed of the
train had no causal connection with the collision. We quote
from the opinion :
"The plaintiffs argue that if the train had been
proceeding at a speed of only 15 miles per hour when
it was observed by August, he would have proceeded
on his way and not attempted to stop. There is no
evidence that he would have so acted. That argument is based upon pure speculation. In our opinion,
the plaintiff's attempt to stop after he discovered
the approaching train was exactly what he would
have attempted to do had the train been proceeding
at only 15 miles per hour. The jury could only spec·
ulate as to what he would have done had the speed
of the train been lawful and as to the success of any
attempt to cross ahead of the train.
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"The plaintiffs further argue that if the train
had been running at a lawful rate of speed, the automobile with its brakes set, would have skidded safely
across the track a second or two ahead of the train.
\Vhen the plaintiff August set his brakes, he was
traveling at a speed of less than 30 miles per hour.
What his speed was at the time he hit the side of the
second car no one attempted to estimate. The argument is based upon estimates of distances and speeds
considered as absolute verities. In our opinion, the
finding of proximate cause, based upon the speed
of the train, is so speculative and is so lacking in reasonable certainty, as to be incapable of being upheld.
"We are therefore compelled to conclude that
the sole proximate cause of the collision was the
speed of the automobile which obviously was so
great as not to permit of its being stopped on the
icy road after the approaching train was discovered.
This case is similar in some of its features to that
of Duame v. Feltus, 229 Wis. 655, 283 N. W. 299,
301, where an automobile skidded 70 feet into a twocar train operated by the Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co.
The plaintiff there was a passenger on the train.
The court concluded in that case that the negligence
of Feltus, the driver of the automobile, 'was the re.:
sponsible cause of the plaintiffs injury.'"
In Hickey v. Missou'ri Pacific Railroad Corporation,
8 F. (2d) 128, (C. C. A. Eighth), the plaintiff, administrator of the estate of his father, brought this action involving a collision between a truck and a train at a public
crossing. The public highway extended in an east and
west direction and crossed the railroad tracks at a right
angle. The train approached the crossing from the north
and the truck from the east. The driver of the truck, who
was the son of the deceased, was an experienced driver and
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both he and his father were famliar with the crossing.
The view of the driver to the north was completely obstructed for a distance of 175 feet until the truck reached
the point 20 feet east of the tracks. When the truck arrived
at the last mentioned point, the driver saw the approaching
train and immediately applied the foot brake and then, the
emergency brake. The automobile skidded upon a sheet
of ice which extended about 15 or 20 feet east of the track.
The automobile was coasting on a slight downgrade toward
the track and was moving at about eight miles per hour
when the brakes were applied and it began to skid on the
ice. The driver said he did not know of the existence of
the sheet of ice until the car began to skid although the
accident occurred in daylight. After the automobile passed
over the ice the driver applied the power in an attempt to
cross the tracks ahead of the train. The attempt was almost
successful, the train striking the rear end of the automobile. The evidence warranted a finding by the jury that
no warning signals were given as the train approached
the crossing. The trial court directed a verdict for the
defendant upon the ground that the failure of the railroad
to give reasonable warning of the approaching of the train
was not the proximate cause of the collision. The Circuit
Court of Appeals held this ruling to be correct. The contention of the plaintiff that the jury could properly determine that the automobile would have been stopped if a
reasonable warning of the approach of the train had been
given was answered as follows:
"It is claimed on behalf of the plaintiff that,
if the usual signals had been given, he would not
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have driven the automobile so near the crossing as
20 feet before applying the brakes. Whether this
claim is anything more than an afterthought may be
open to doubt. There was no testimony showing
how far from the railroad track plaintiff would have
tried to stop if he had heard any signals from the
approaching train. Furthermore, it is pure speculation whether, if the brakes had been applied at a
distance from the crossing of 30 to 40 feet, the accident would not have happened just the same. There
is no evidence in the record that the condition of the
road 30 or 40 feet from the crossing was any different from the condition within the 20-foot limit. If
the usual signals had been given by those in charge
of the train, and if the brakes had been applied to the
automobile when at a distance of 30 or 40 feet from
the crossing, yet, if the icy condition which plaintiff
claims existed within the 20-foot limit extended as
far back as 30 or 40 feet, the accident might very
likely have happened, notwithstanding the attempt
to stop the automobile 30 or 40 feet from the track.
"Such being the facts disclosed by the record,
we hold that within the rules announced in the foregoing cases, the failure by defendant to give customary signals when the train was approaching the
crossing, if such failure in fact existed, was not the
proximate cause of the accident."
In Stroud v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 243 Pac.
1089, 75 Mont. 384, the plaintiff was riding in a truck
driven by Harris. The truck approached a public crossing
over a highway covered with ice. When the train came
into view the truck was traveling only three or four miles
per hour. When about 17 feet from the railroad track the
driver, having become aware of the approaching train,
applied the brakes, which caused the wheels to lock and
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the truck to slide into and against the front end of the
locomotive. The train was traveling about 10 to 25 miles
per hour. No warning of its approach to the crossing was
given. The court held that neither the plaintiff nor the
driver was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law. The plaintiff contended that if proper warning
signals of the approach of the train had been given the
driver of the truck would have been able to stop and avoid
the collision. This contention was answered by the Supreme
Court of Montana thus:
"The weakness of the plaintiffs' case is that
they failed to introduce testimony which would have
warranted a finding that, if they had been warned,
they would have taken earlier steps to have avoided
the collision by sooner applying the brakes, or not
entering upon the crossing until after the train had
passed. Instead of making this essential showing,
the testimony in the record leads inevitably to the
conclusion that the proximate cause of the collision
was the icy and slippery condition of the planking
on the crossing, which caused the truck to skid forward until it collided with the locomotive. The defendant was not responsible for the condition of the
crossing; it did not know of its condition, and was
not chargeable with knowledge thereof.

*

*

*

*

*

"While counsel for plaintiffs concede that the
collision was occasioned by the icy and slippery
condition of the crossing which caused the truck to
skid, he contends that there was nothing about the
icy crossing which would have made it dangerous
in the absence of the defendant's negligence, that it
was a condition for which neither party was responsible, and he invokes the rule laid down in Meisner
v. City of Dillon, 74 P. 130, 29 Mont. 116:
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"''Vhere two causes contribute to an injury,
one of which is directly traceable to the defendant's negligence, and for the other of which
neither party is responsible, the defendant will
be held liable, provided the injury would not
have been sustained but for such negligence.'
"But this rule has no application to the facts
in this case, because, as above pointed out, there is
nothing to show that the alleged negligent act of
the defendant in failing to give the crossing signals
in any way influenced the plaintiffs' actions; so it
cannot be said on this record that 'the injury would
not have been sustained but for such negligence.' "
In Barrett v. United States Railroad Administration
et al., 194 N. W. 222, 196 Iowa 1143, the plaintiff, alone in
her automobile, approached a railroad crossing at a rate of
speed of about 10 or 12 miles per hour. When she reached
a point 40 feet from the tracks she observed an approaching
train about the same distance from the crossing. She applied her brakes, but the automobile slid on the icy pavemen until it had almost cleared the track. There was evidence that the train crew failed to give the statutory warning signals as the train came to the crossing. The court
held that there was no basis in the evidence for a finding
that proper warning signals would have enabled the plaintiff to avoid the collision. The point is disposed of in this
language:

"* * * Proximate cause is a mixed question
of law and fact. Is it sufficiently a question of fact
under the evidence in this case to warrant submission to the jury? In other words, could a jury assume, and could the court permit the jury to assume,
that, if the station signals had been given, the car
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would not have skidded over the ice onto the track,
or that the plaintiff would have stopped her car so
far away that the car could not have so skidded? The
jury could not properly pass upon such question arbitrarily. The burden was on the plaintiff to show
that the collision was the proximate effect of the
failure to give the train signals. If the record discloses no evidence of a causal connection, or if the
evidence of plaintiff negatives a causal connection,
between the failure of the signals and the happening of the collision, the jury has no discretion to find
otherwise. In such a case, it is the duty of the court
as a matter of law to direct a nonsuit.
"We cannot avoid the conclusion that this record contains no evidence upon which a finding of
causal connection could be based. It follows that
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict ought
to have been sustained upon that ground, and that
its motion for a new trial should have been sustained upon the same ground."
The case of Haarstrich v. Oregon Short Line Railroad
Company, 70 Utah 552, 262 Pac. 100, is decisive of the point
that any failure on the part of the railroad to give additional warning of the approach of the automobile was not a
proximate cause of the collision and that the proximate cause
of the collision was the negilgence of the driver of the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding. In that case the
automobile in which the plaintiff was riding as a guest approacijed the crossing in the night time at a rate of speed
which the jury very conservatively fixed at 30 miles per
hour, and struck a slow moving train that had gone on to the
crossing without reasonable warning. This court held that
any failure to give reasonable warning of the approach of
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the train was not a proximate cause of the collision but that
the negligent operation of the automobile was. The only
factual distinction betweeen the case at bar and the
Haarstrich case is that in the latter the automobile did
not slide a distance of 60 feet or more on an icy street.
Other Utah cases in point are :
Olson v. The Denver and Rio G1·ande Western
Railroad Company, 98 Utah 208, 98 P. (2d)
944;
Davis v. Jltlellen, 55 Utah 9, 182 Pac. 920;
Edd v. U. P. Coal Company, 25 Utah 293, 71
Pac. 215;
O'Brien v. Alston, 61 Utah 368, 213 Pac. 791;
Edgar v. Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 32 Utah 330, 90 Pac. 745;
Anderson v. Bransford, 39 Utah 256, 116 Pac.
1023;
Hansen v. Clyde, . . . Utah ... , 56 P. (2d)
1366.
Mr. Justice Wolfe dissented from the majority opinion in Hansen v. Clyde, supra. He makes a very logical analysis of the principle of proximate cause in negligence cases and places the situation in the case at bar in the
same category as the H aarstrich case. He demonstrates the
situation in which the negligence of the driver of one vehicle
cannot be thrust upon the operator of another vehicle. The
situation in which that may not be done is the precise situation we have in the present case. Here, the driver of a motor
vehicle approaches a place of danger at such a rate of speed
that the moment he attempts to reduce that speed he loses
all control of the vehicle, which then careens wildly until it
crashes into another moving vehicle. Nothing that the oper-
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ators of the latter vehicle did or omitted to do caused the
operator of the first vehicle to lose his control of it. That
control was lost solely because of the conduct of the motorist.
We most earnestly submit that the evidence in this
case is wholly insufficient to establish any negligence on the
part of the defendants and that the trial court erred in refusing to direct the verdict in favor of the appellants.

POINT II
THE SPECIAL VERDICT IS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
THE PLAINTIFF.
The special verdict in the form of questions and answers
is as follows:

"Question No. 1: Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the bell on the locomotive
which collided with the automobile in which plaintiff was riding was not rung continuously from a
point 80 rods from the intersection of Second South
Street with Fourth West Street in Salt Lake City,
U~h?
.
"Answer (Yes or No) No.

"Question No. 2: If your answer to Question
No. 1 is 'Yes,' do you further find by a preponderance of all the evidence that the failure to have the
bell on the engine ringing continuously for 80 rods
was a proximate cause of the injury, if any, sustained
by plaintiff?
"Answer (Yes or No) Not Answered.
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"Question No. 3: Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence introduced in this case that the
locomotive involved in the collision was driven into
the intersection of Second South Street with Fourth
West Street during the prevalence of a snow storm
without the whistle thereon being sounded just prior
to the entrance of the locomotive into the said intersection?
"Answer (Yes or No) Yes.
"Question No. 4: If your answer to Question
No.3 is 'Yes,' do you further find by a preponderance
of the evidence that this failure to sound the whistle
was a proximate cause of the injuries, if any, sustained by the plaintiff?
"Answer (Yes or No) Yes.
"Question No. 5: Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the light on ·the south end
of the locomotive was not burning just prior to and
at the time of the collision with the automobile in
which plaintiff was riding?
"Answer (Yes or No) No.
"Question No. 6: If your answer to Question
No.5 is 'Yes,' do you further find by a preponderance
of the evidence that such failure to have the light
burning was a proximate cause of the injuries, if
any, suffered by the plaintiff?
"Answer (Yes or No) Not Answered.
"Question No. 7: Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the trainmen on the locomotive negligently failed to keep a lookout for automobiles crossing the intersection of Second South
Street with Fourth West Street?
"Answer (Yes or No) Yes.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

36
"Question No. 8: If your answer to Question
No. 7 is 'Yes,' do you further find by a preponderance of the evidence that had the trainmen kept the
lookout of reasonable, prudent persons under the
circumstances the hostler on the locomotive could
have blown his whistle or stopped his engine in time
to have avoided the collision after it was apparent
to him or should have been apparent to a reasonable,
prudent person that the driver of the automobile was
not going to stop his automobile before driving into
the path of the locomotive?
"Answer (Yes or No) Yes.
"Question No. 9: If your answer to Question
No.8 is 'Yes,' do you further find by a preponderance
of the evidence that such failure to stop or blow the
whistle was a proximate cause of the injuries, if any,
sustained by the plaintiff?
"Answer (Yes or No) Yes.
"Question No. 10: Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a watchman or
flagman on duty at the intersection and at the time
of the collision between the locomotive and the automobile in which plaintiff was riding?
"Answer (Yes or No) Yes.
"Question No. 11: If your answer to Question
No. 10 is 'Yes', do you find by a preponderance of
the evidence that the watchman or flagman negligently failed to be stationed in the intersection or
that he negligently failed to signal the plaintiff or
the driver of her car that a locomotive was approaching the intersection?
"Answer (Yes or No) Yes.
"Question No. 12: If your answer to Question
No. 11 is 'Yes,' do you find by a preponderance of
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the evidence that such negligence was a proximate
cause of the injuries, if any, suffered by plaintiff?
"Answer (Yes or No) Yes.

''Question No. 13: Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff's husband, William Lodder, drove the automobile in which they
were riding into the intersection of Second South
Street with Fourth vVest Street at a rate of speed
that was greater than was safe, reasonable, and prudent, having regard to all surrounding circumstances
then existing?
"Answer (Yes or No) No.
"Question No. 14: Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the husband of plaintiff
drove the automobile in which plaintiff was riding
into the intersection of Second South and Fourth
West without keeping the same lookout which ~
reasonably prudent person would have kept under
the same circumstances then existing?
"Answer (Yes or No) No.

~

"Question No. 15: If your answer to Questions
Nos. 13 and 14, or either of them, is 'Yes,' do you
further find by a preponderance of the evidence that
the conduct of the driver of the car in which plaintiff was riding in driving too fast, if he did, or in
failing to keep such a lookout, if he so failed, was
the sole proximate cause of the injuries, if any,
sustained by plaintiff?
"Answer (Yes or No) Not Answered.
"Question No. 16: Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff herself negligently failed to keep a lookout for the approach of the
locomotive with which the car in which she was
riding collided?
"Answer (Yes or No) No.
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"Question No. 17: If your answer to Question
No. 16 is 'Yes,' do you find by a preponderance of
the evidence that had she kept such a lookout as a
reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances would have kept, she could have appraised
the driver of the car in which she was riding of the
danger in time to permit him to have avoided the
accident?
"Answer (Yes or No) Not Answered.
"Question No. 18: If your answer to Questions
Nos. 16 and 17 is 'Yes,' do you further find by a
preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff's negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of her own injuries, if any?
"Answer (Yes or No) Not Answered."
The issues raised by'the pleadings were: (1) whether
the Railroad Company failed to give reasonable warning to
motorists of the approach of the locomotive to the intersection; (2) whether the failure to give such warning was a
proximate cause of the collision; (3) whether the op~rators
of the locomotive maintained a reasonable lookout for the
automobile; ( 4) whether the defendants had a clear opportunity to avoid the collision by the exercise of reasonable
care after the engine crew saw or should have seen that
the automobile would be unable to stop before reaching the
tracks.
It is unnecessary to cite authorities in support of the

proposition that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to
establish the affirmative of issues 1 and 2 or issues 3 and
4 in order to be entitled to a judgment in her_favor. These
are the controlling issues of liability, and, unless the special
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verdict establishes the affirmative of them, the judgment
appealed from is unsupported by essential facts. We submit that the special verdict fails completely to establish
affirmatively. any of the controlling issues above enumerated.
First, there is no finding that any of the defendants
failed to give reasonable warning of the approach of the
locomotive to the intersection.
It is elementary that in the absence of the statute or

ordinance a railroad is not under any duty to give any
particular type of warning at any particular time or place,
of the approach of its locomotive or train to a public crossing. The duty is merely to give what under the circumstances amounts to a reasonable warning. It may employ
any means or devices at any time or place that are adequate
to convey to motorists a reasonable warning of the approaching train or engine. These propositions are well established
by many authorities. In the case of Blackwell v. Union
Pacific Railroad Company, 52 S. W. (2d) 814, ... Mo.... ,
it is held:
"It was defendants' duty to warn plaintiff of
the train's approach to the crossing, but they were
not required to give such warning by any particular method. In other words, a failure to warn by a
particular method would not· be negligence if an
adequate warning was given by some other method.
Plaintiff concedes that she would not be entitled to
recover on the ground that defendants failed to
sound a signal of warning if a sufficient warning
was given by the ringing of the automatic bell, or
by a brakeman giving signals with a lighted lantern, or if the lights at the crossing had been burn-
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ing so that the approach of the train could have
been discovered in time to avert the collision. This
being true, plaintiff's instruction P-1, which directs
a verdict for plaintiff on the sole ground that defendants negligently failed to sound any signal of
warning, is fatally erroneous, in that it does not require a finding that defendants did not give a warning by any of the other methods mentioned. In
other words, the instruction does not require the
jury to find the facts necessary to constitute a
failure to warn."
Michael v. C. B. & Q. Railroad Company, 131
N. W. 892, 146 Wis. 466;
Nicholas v. C. B. & Q. Railroad Company, 100
N. W. 1115, 125 Iowa 236;
Fish v. So. Pacific Railroad, 143 P. (2d) 917,
... Ore.....
The finding that the locomotive was driven into the
intersection during the prevalence of a snow storm without
the whistle thereon being sounded just prior to the entrance
of the locomotive into the intersection is at most a finding
that a particular kind of warning signal was not given at a
particular spot. It falls far short of a determination that
reasonable warning of the approach of the locomotive to the
crossing was not given. Furthermore, it is almost inconceivable how the blowing of the whistle just prior to the
entry of the locomotive into the intersection could have
afforded any effective warning to anyone.
The findings with respect to the conduct of the watchman are likewise insufficient to support the judgment, because they, at most, determine merely that a specified signal
was not given by a specified individual. There is no statute
which requires a railroad to maintain a watchman at any
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crossing or intersection in this state. There is likewise no
ordinance which requires that a watchman be stationed at
the crossing where the accident occurred nor is there any
statute or ordinance requiring a watchman to give any
warning or any signals of the approach of a train or locomotive to a highway. The findings with respect to the
watchman and his failure to signal the plaintiffs fall far
short of a finding that the defendants failed to give reasonable warning of the approach of the locomotive.
It is unnecessary to consider whether the findings with

respect to the watchman might be sufficient to sustain a
judgment against him. He was not a party to the action and
no judgment has been rendered against him.
We submit that the findings with respect to the watchman do not even determine that he failed to signal the
plaintiffs of the approach of the locomotive. Finding No.
11 is to the effect that the watchman negligently failed to
be stationed in the intersection or that he negligently failed
to signal the plaintiffs that the locomotive was approaching
the intersection. This finding incorporates two distinct
propositions in the alternative. Since it is a finding that the
watchman failed to station himself in the intersection or
that he failed to give a signal to the plaintiffs, neither
omission is established. The finding, destroys itself.
Second, there is no finding that a failure to give a
reasonable warning of the approach of the locomotive was
a proximate cause of the collision. Since there was no
determination of a failure to give reasonable warning, that
omission is fatal to the judgment. There is nothing to which
proximate cause could attach.
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It remains to be considered whether the findings with

respect to the matter of lookout and operation of the locomotive are sufficient to sustain the judgment. We recognize
that the operators of the locomotive were bound to maintain
a reasonable lookout for the plaintiff's automobile as the
locomotive approached the point of collision. There is no
finding in the special verdict that the operators of the locomotive failed to maintain such a lookout. Finding No.7 is
merely a determination that the trainman negligently failed
to keep a lookout for automobiles crossing the intersection
of Second South Street with Fourth West Street. No argument is required to demonstrate that this falls short of determining that the trainman failed to maintain a reasonable
lookout for the plaintiff's automobile as the locomotive
approached the point of contact. Any failure to maintain
the type of lookout' described in Finding No. 7 is utterly
immaterial because there was no duty imposed upon the
trainman to maintain such lookout. The plaintiffs never
claimed or asserted a failure to keep such lookout. The
automobile never crossed the intersection of the two streets
because it ran into the locomotive. To keep a lookout for
automobiles at the place described in Finding No. 7 would
be to keep a lookout altogether too late to have any bearing
whatsoever upon the accident. The only lookout, so far as
the train crew is concerned, that could have afforded the
plaintiffs any protection whatsoever, was a lookout for the
plaintiff's automobile as the locomotive approached the
intersection. There is no finding that such a lookout was
not maintained.
Even if there were a finding that the trainmen failed
to maintain a proper lookout for plaintiffs' automobile as the
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locomotive approached the intersection, no legal significance
could be attached to it unless it be accompanied by a finding of facts demonstrating that such failure to keep a proper
lookout was a proximate cause of the collision. Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R. Co., supra.
In order for the failure to keep a proper lookout to be a
proximate cause of the collision there must be a finding to
the effect that if the trainmen had maintained a proper
lookout they would have seen the automobile in a situation
of peril in ample time to have brought the locomotive to a
stop before it reached the point of collision or that the train
crew could have given the plaintiffs an effective warning in
time to have enabled them to stop the automobile before it
reached the tracks on which the locomotive was being operated. This finding must establish that the train crew had a
clear-cut opportunity to stop the locomotive or give the
signal in time to enable the plaintiffs to stop the automobile
and thus avoid the collision. Again quoting from the Van
Wagoner case:

"* * * The opportunity to avoid the accident must not be a possibility; it must be a clear
opportunity. Not even by speculation could the jury
reach a verdict on the theory that the train crew
had time to appreciate that deceased was negligent
and that by reasonable means they could have avoided the ensuing collision. When, as in this jurisdiction, a train has the preferred right of way, its operator is entitled to assume the driver of a car will
yield to this preferment, and if the doctrine of last
clear chance is to be invoked, it must clearly appear
that time permitted the train crew to appreciate
deceased's predicament, and to give warnings sufficiently early enough for the deceased to extricate
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himself, or the time element was sufficient to permit
the crew to bring the train to a stop."
The answer of the jury to Question No. 8 that if the
trainman had kept the lookout of a reasonably prudent
person under the circumstances, the hostler could have blown
his whistle or stopped his engine in time to avoid the collision after it was apparent to him, or should have been
apparent to him, that the motorist was not going to stop
before driving into the path of the locomotive is a total
nullity and affords no support whatever to the judgment. It fails entirely to determine that the train crew
had a clear or any opportunity to avoid the collision by the
exercise of reasonable care after they knew or should have
known that the driver would be unable to extricate himself
from a dangerous situation.
The futility of Finding No. 8 is made more obvious by
the alternative proposition embraced in it. It says that if
the trainman had kept a reasonable lookout, the hostler
could have done two alternative acts; (a) he could have
blown his whistle, or (b) stopped his engine in time to avoid
the collision. Obviously, the blowing of the whistle after
the train crew saw the peril of the automoble was much too
late to avoid any benefit to either the driver or the plaintiff.
The answer to Question No. 9 is likewise an utterly
irrelevant finding. If the train crew had a clear opportunity
to avoid the collision by the exercise of reasonable care after
they should have seen the perilous situation of the automobile, their failure to exercise such care must necessarily
have been the proximate cause of the collision, but since there
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is no such finding, the conclusion of the jury that "such
failure to stop or blow the whistle was a proximate cause of
the injuries" is entirely immaterial. ·
Section 104-25-1, U. C. A. 1943, defines a special verdict
as that by which the jury finds the facts, only leaving the
judgment to the court, and provides that such verdict must
present the conclusions of fact as established by the evidence
and that those conclusions of fact must be so presented that
nothing shall remain to the court but to draw from them,
conclusions of law. It is plain from the language of this
statute that unless the special verdict determines affirmatively all issues upon which liability of the defendant depends, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff cannot be rested
upon it.
See: In Re Hansen's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 Pac. 256.
Inasmuch as the verdict does not determine that any
of the defendants failed to give reasonable warning of the
approach of the locomotive to the crossing or that the men
in charge of the locomotive failed to keep a proper lookout
for the plaintiffs' automobile or failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision after a reasonable lookout
would have disclosed to them that the automobile could not
be stopped short of the railroad track or that any of the
omissions stated were the proximate cause of the collision,
it is fatally insufficient to support the judgment rendered.
POINT III
NO FINDING IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT CAN BE IMPLIED.
It has been demonstrated that the special verdict does
not determine the controlling issues of liability and is in-
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sufficient to support a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
There is no statute in this state which supplies a determination of the omitted issues. The trial court made no finding
either for or against the plaintiff upon the omitted issues.
Undoubtedly the respondent will rely upon Rule 49 (a) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure to supply the insufficiency of
the verdict.
That rule in substance provides that if the court omits
any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or the evidence,
each party waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue
so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its
submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such
demand the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do
so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accordance
with the judgment on the special verdict.
There are several reasons why this rule cannot be invoked to bridge the gap in the special verdict.
First, it is observed that no implied finding can be
indulged upon an issue not supported by the evidence. We
have demonstrated that the omitted issues were not supported by the evidence and that as matter of law the alleged
failure of the engineman to give additional warning of the
approach of the locomotive was not a proximate cause of
the collision. But even if this court were to hold otherwise,
Rule 49 (a) cannot be used to cure the insufficiency of the
verdict.
In such an unlooked-for event, the case would stand
in this position: The trial court of its own motion and over
the protest in effect of all parties required the jury tore·
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turn a special verdict. This verdict was prepared by the
trial judge without any suggestion or assistance of counsel
of either party. In so doing, he failed to submit to the jury
the issue raised by the pleadings of whether the defendants
failed to give reasonable warning of the approach of the
locomotive or whether such failure, if any, was a proximate
cause of the collision. Consistently with their position and
contentions throughout the trial, the defendants did not request that either of these issues be submitted to the jury.
Had they made any such request, they would thereby have
admitted, at least impliedly, that these issues were issues of
fact for the jury. Certainly, such a request by the defendants
would be utterly inconsistent with their position that there
were no issues of fact for the jury.
But suppose it turns out that these were issues of fact,
can Rule 49 (a) be invoked to supply an adjudication of these
issues in favor of the plaintiff? It is certain that they have
not been adjudicated by the jury, or by the trial court for
that matter.
It is significant that the plaintiff made no request to
have these issues submitted to the jury, although she is the
one who demanded a jury trial. The burden rested upon her
to prove the affirmative of those issues. Does she not, by
failing to request that these issues upon which she had the
burden of proving be submitted to the jury, do more than
merely waive her right to have them adjudicated by the
jury? Does she not by such failure, in effect confess that
she has failed to present any evidence sufficient to make
the issues of fact? We submit that Rule 49 (a), rightly
construed, requires affirmative answers to these questions.
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In other words, if a party fails to request the submission to
the jury of issues upon which he has the burden of proof,
he not only waives his right to trial by jury of those issues,
but actually abandons them. Having abandoned the issue,
no adjudication of it in his favor can be made by the court
or implied by the appellate court. Any other interpretation
of Rule 49 (a) would, we submit, render it invalid by making it a rule of law instead of a rule of practice or procedure.
In the State of Texas there has long been in force a
statute which, though frequently amended, embraces essentially the provisions of Rule 49 (a). As will appear from
the cases cited below, the statute provides that when a case
is submitted on special verdict all issues made by the pleadings and evidence must be submitted, and that the failure
to submit an issue shall not be deemed a ground for reversing
of the judgment, unless its submission has been requested
in writing by the party complaining of the judgment, and
that on appeal or writ of error an issue not submitted and not
requested is deemed to be found by the court in such manner as to support the judgment, if there is evidence to
sustain such finding. The Supreme Court of Texas has
several times construed this statute to mean that no finding
of fact can be made by· the court or be implied in support
of a judgment in favor of a party who has failed to request
the submission to the jury of an essential issue upon which
he has the burden of proof. See:

Wichita Falls and Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Pepper,
135 S. W. (2d) 79, ... Tex.... ;
Ormsby v. Ratcliffe, 1 S. W. (2d) 1085, 117 Tex.
242;
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Colbert v. Dallas Jo'int Stock Land Bank, 102,
S. \V. (2d) 1031, 129 Tex. 235.
We quote from lVichita Falls & Oklahoma Railway
Company v. Pepper as follows:
"The fundamental principle underlying the construction of Art. 2190 is that in a case tried before
a jury each litigant has the legal right to have the
jury pass upon the ultimate or essential issues of
fact raised by the pleadings and the evidence, and
findings made by the jury thereon, sufficient to
form the basis of a judgment. The power of the
judge to make findings where none are submitted
or requested does not extend to ultimate or essential
issues which are necessary to base a judgment thereon, or to independent grounds of recovery or defense. A party may waive an issue upon which he
relies for recovery or defense, by failing to request
its submission. \Ve find no language in Art. 2190
which places the duty on the plaintiff to present
defensive issues which would support a judgment
for the defendant; and no duty rests on the defendant to present such issues as are essential to a recovery by the plaintiff. In such case, if the party
has failed to request for submission such issue, or
issues, as will sustain his action or defense, he has
not met the burden placed upon him by law, and no
waiver can be imputed to the other party for such
failure."
We emphasize that the rule does not provide that a
finding of fact essential to the support of the judgment can
be implied. Only such findings as are in accord with the
judgment may be implied. This carefully considered
language of the rule was obviously designed to preclude the
implication of any finding essential or indispensable to the
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support of the judgment. Such interpretation of the rule
makes it what it purports to be, namely, a rule of procedure
and not a principle of substantive law.
Another convincing reason why no finding in support of
the judgment can be implied by virtue of Rule 49 (a) is
that the defendants had no opportunity to prepare any issues
for submission to the jury or to prepare any requests for
explanation or instructions covering any special issues. The
conduct of the trial of this case is suigeneris. The parties
concluded the presentation of their evidence late in the
evening of December 6 (R. 306). The court announced that
the trial would resume at 9 o'clock the next morning. Both
sides submitted requested instructions for a general verdict.
The defendants filed separate motions for a directed verdict.
None of the parties requested that any special interrogatories
or issues be submitted.
The trial resumed promptly at 9 o'clock the next morning, not in open court but in the Judge's chambers. Here
for the first time the form of the verdict and the court's
determination to require a special verdict were made known
to the defendants' counsel. While we do not undertake to
speak for the plaintiff's counsel, it would appear from the
record that they too for the first time learned of the special
verdict. Defendants' counsel protested against the submission to the jury of the entire special verdict. He attempted
to state his theory of the case to the court but was summarily
interrupted (R. 307). He did object to each of the interrogatories but was informed by the court that he could take
his exceptions later. When he attempted to point out that
conceivably there might be an issue as to whether or not

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

51
the negligence of the driver of the automobile and the icy
condition of the street were the proximate cause of the
accident, the suggestion was brushed aside. The court insisted that the issue of proximate cause was covered by
questions 13, 14 and 15. After some brief discussion between
the court, counsel for plaintiff and counsel for the Depot
Company, in which the court elaborated somewhat on a
wholly erroneous theory of proximate cause, the court proceeded to read the special verdict to the jury.
If Rule 49 (a) has the effect of supplying a finding

of fact in favor of the plaintiff upon the issues of liability
not submitted to the jury under the circumstances of the
trial of this action, it ceases to be a rule of procedure and
becomes a device by which a trial court can deprive a party
of all semblance of a fair hearing. It would make of it a
weapon in the hands of the trial court whereby he could
take over both the prosecution and the defense of an action
and conduct the trial without regard to any of the established conceptions of a fair trial.
We recognize that the rule does not require that the
court give any notice of its intention to require a special
verdict. Such notice is, however, indispensable to a fair
trial and must be read into the rule. Such a requirement is
read into statutes which require that special verdicts requested by one party shall be served upon the other.

In Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. R. Company v. Smith,
69 N. E. 873, ... Ill. ... , which was a crossing case, the
trial court submitted a special interrogatory without having
advised counsel for the plaintiff beforehand that such special
interrogatory would be presented. The defendant's counsel
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thus had no opportunity to study the special interrogatory
or offer for submission other interrogatories. The jury answered the interrogatory unfavorably to the defendant, and
the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the ruling of the
trial court in submitting the special interrogatory without
first having given the defendant the opportunity to prepare
for submission additional interrogatories. The Illinois Practice Act required the submission of special interrogatories
when requested by any of the parties, but required the demanding counsel to serve the interrogatories upon counsel
for the other side. The decision of the court in part reads~
"It is true that the Legislature did not see fit to
command the court; but every reason which could
have moved them to require the adverse party to submit an interrogatory applies with equal force where
the same interrogatory is propounded by the court
without a request, and we would scarcely adopt a rule
of practice that a court might be less fair and just to
a litigant than the statute requires his adversary
to be. If it should be held proper practice for
the court, of its own motion, to give an interrogatory
without notice to parties, they would be deprived
of. the opportunities which the statute secures to
them, for the mere reason that the court gives the
interrogatory:"

J

POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON THAT ISSUE AS REQUESTED
BY THE DEFENDANTS.
The court did submit in questions 16, 17 and 18 the
question whether the plaintiff negligently failed to keep a
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lookout for the approach of the locomotive and whether she
could have apprised the driver of the danger in time to permit him to have avoided the accident if she had kept such
lookout. The court also submitted the question whether, if
the answers to questions 16 and 17 were yes, whether the
plaintiff's negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of her
injuries.
These questions obviously do not submit the issue of
whether the plaintiff was negligent or whether her negligence, if any, contributed to the collision. They submitted
only the question of whether she failed to keep a reasonable
lookout for the automobile and whether such lookout would
have enabled her to warn the driver in time to permit him
to avoid the accident. It was the duty of the plaintiff to
exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision. Reasonable
care involves something more than merely keeping a lookout. She was entirely familiar with the crossing and with
the condition of the street over which she was riding. She
was also fully aware of the speed at which the automobile
approached the crossing. A jury could most certainly properly determine that the exercise of reasonable care would
have prompted her to protest against the unreasonable and
unlawful rate of speed at which her husband was approaching the tracks. She was sitting in the front seat next to
the driver, who was her husband. A jury could rightly say
that she should have warned the driver not only of the danger
presented by the approaching locomotive but also the danger
inherent in his excessive speed.

In Morris v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 163 N. W. 799,
101 Neb. 479, the plaintiff was riding as a guest in an auto-
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mobile which was struck by a train at a public crossing
with which he was familiar. He was held guilty of contributory negligence in failing to caution the driver to slow
down. The court said :
"In the present case plaintiff was not charged
with the responsibility of driving the automobile.
His opportunity to be on the lookout for impending
danger at a place he must have known to be dangerous was therefore perhaps better than that of the
driver. Knowing the vicinity and the railroad crossing as he says he did, it was plainly his duty to use
every reasonable effort to induce the driver of the
automobile to slow down or to stop the machine if
the view of the track was obstructed. It is not shown
in the record before us that he cautioned the driver
about impending danger before they reached the
track where the collision occurred, nor that he made
any attempt to induce his companion to slacken
the speed of the car or to stop."
See also Phillips v. Davis, 3 F. (2d) 798; Colorado S.
R. Company v. Thomas, 81 Pac. 801, 33 Colo. 517; Brown
v. Alton Railroad Company, 151 S. W. (2d) 727, ... Mo.
Appeals ... ; Tice v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 96 P. (2d) 1022,
... Cal. App .... ; Wagner v. A. T. & S. F. R. R. Co., 292 . !
Pac. 645, 210 Cal. 526.
It will be observed that the only finding which was
made by the jury with respect to the conduct of the plaintiff was an implied negative finding to wit that she did not -~
negligently fail to keep a lookout for the approach of the
locomotive. The special verdict does not even require the
jury to determine whether, if she had kept a reasonable
lookout, she could have warned the driver in time to enable ~

1

1
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him to stop, because the jury was directed to answer Question No. 17 only in the event the answer to question 16 was
yes. Further, the jury was not required to determine
whether the negligence of the plaintiff contributed to the
collision and injury of which she complained. It was not
even required to determine whether her negligence was a
proximate cause of the accident and injury, because they
were directed to answer question 18 only in the event they
answered both 16 and 17 in the affirmative. It is clear,
therefore, that the special verdict does not either submit or
determine the issue whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable care to avoid the collision or the issue whether the
negligence of the plaintiff, if any, contributed to the collision and injury.
No finding adverse to the defendants upon the issues
of contributory negligence can be implied under Rule 49
(a). This is so because the court undertook to submit the
issue on its own motion, but did so imperfectly and erroneously. Further, the defendants requested that the
issue be submitted by its Requested Instruction No. 9. Although the issues might have been framed somewhat differently if the defendants had had an opportunity to do so,
Requested Instruction No. 9 clearly and succinctly stated
the issues and requested that they be submitted.
A statute which is in substance identical to Rule 49a has
long been in force in the State of Wisconsin. It has been
held repeatedly under that statute that no implied finding
can be indulged in support of a judgment upon an issue not
submitted to the jury where the complaining party has called the attention of the trial court to the omitted issue by a
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requested instruction or by a request of a general or informal character.
In the case of Olwell v. Skobis, 105 N. W. 777, 176 Wis.
308, the plaintiff alleged that she had sustained injuries by
reason of the negligence of the defendants in chipping off
with a chisel a piece of iron from an office building. The
piece of iron struck the plaintiff as she was leaving the
office, and she recovered. a judgment upon a special verdict. The trial court failed to submit to the jury the issue
whether the cutting or chipping of the iron was done by the
defendants in the usual safe and workmanlike manner.
The defendants requested an answer to the inquiry whether
the work of smoothing the fron water rib was done by them
in all respects in the usual and ordinary way generally pursued in doing such work in like locations and under similar
circumstances by workers in iron in Milwaukee .. The defendants also requested an instruction that if the defendants were
carrying on the work in the way that such work in like
locations and under similar circumstances was usually and
ordinarily carried on throughout the City of Milwaukee and
vicinity general,· then the employees of the defendants were
not guilty of any· want of ordinary care in so carrying on
such work. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment for
failure of the trial court to submit the issue whether the
cutting and chipping of the iron was done by the defendants in the usual safe and workmanlike manner. The pertinent parts of the decision are :
"Counsel for the plaintiff contend that the question so requested was defective, in that it limited
the inquiry to the mere work of smoothing the iron
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water rib, and also limited the inquiry to the way
generally pursued by workers in iron in Milwaukee
and vicinity. There seems to be much force in the
criticism. The true test is that degree of care which
is ordinarily observed by men of ordinary care and
prudence, or by men generally, engaged in the same
or similar business, under the same or similar circumstances. Guinard v. Knapp-Stout & Co., 95 Wis.
482, 70 N. \V. 671; Rylander v. Laursen, 124 Wis.
2, 102 N. \V. 341. But the request called the attention of the court sharply to the subject. It was
followed by another request, covering one of the
issues thus made by the pleadings, which reads: 'In
smoothing the iron water rib upon the north edge of
the Hyatt light frame in front of the office room
referred to, in the manner in which that work was
done, did the employes of the defendants exercise
such care as is generally and usually exercised under
similar circum~tances by persons in the same line of
business, engaged in doing similar work.' This request is not as concise as it might have been, but
it covered one of the issues in the case.
"Counsel for the defendant sought to have the
question mentioned covered by the jury in an instruction to be given under the second question submitted, to the effect that if the defendants were
carrying on the work 'in the way that such work
in like locations and under similar circumstances
was usually and ordinarily carried on throughout
the city of Milwaukee and vicinity generally, then
the employes of the defendants were not guilty of
any want of ordinary care in so carrying on such
work, and although an injury did result to the plaintiff, yet, nevertheless, if you find that said employes
of defendants were carrying on the work in the
usual and ordinary way of carrying on such work
under similar circumstances, your answer to the
second question will be no.' \\Thile such instruction
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would have been defective in so far as it limited
the inquiry to Milwaukee and vicinity, as already
indicated, yet it served to call the attention of the
court again to the question so at issue and not submitted to the jury. We must hold that the failure
to submit such question to the jury was error."

In Wawrzyniakowski v. Hoffman & Billings Mfg. Co.,
131 N. W. 429, 146 Wis. 153, the defendant called the court's
attention to the omitted issue by a request improper in form
and by a requested instruction to the jury upon the issue.
The Supreme Court held that the omission to submit the
proper issue was sufficiently called to the court's attention
by the improper request and by the request for instruction
and that the judgment which rested upon a special verdict
could not be sustained because of the omission to submit to
the jury a material issue. The court pointed out:
"The duty of framing a special verdict, however, devolves upon the court. Its attention was
sharply called to the issue which the defendant desired to have submitted, although not in exact language. Under these circumstances it was the duty
of the court to frame and propound the correct
question. It is so decided in Olwell v. Skobis, supra."
It was also error for the court to refuse to instruct the
jury upon the issue of contributory negligence as requested
by the defendants. Rule 49 (a) specifically provides that
when a cause is submitted upon special verdict "the court
shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to
enable the jury to make its findings upon each issue." We
submit that where the trial court upon its own motion, with-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

59

out notice to the parties and over their protests, submits a
case to the jury for a special verdict, it is error to fail to
properly instruct the jury upon each special issue, even
without any request by the parties.
In any event, in the circumstances of this case the
trial judge may not properly refuse to grant a requested
instruction merely because it may have some inaccuracies
and may be subject to verbal criticism. If it is a substantially
correct statement of law and is applicable to the facts, it or
some similar instruction must be given.
It will be observed that the statute also requires the

court to instruct the jury upon the law applicable to the
case ( 104-24-14, par. 4). In the case of Smith v. Lenzi,
74 Utah 362, 279 Pac. 893, it is said:
"We have frequently held that the statute requires the court to instruct upon the law applicable
to the case. Upon a question so essential to a proper
determination, and so clearly within the issues made
by the pleadings, it is the duty of the court to instruct. This duty cannot be avoided because a request fairly calling the attention of the court to the
principle of law may also contain some language in
addition to the statement of the legal principle
which may be subject to the criticism of being argumentative. Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co., 68 Utah 85,
249 P. 437; Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 6802; Everts
v. Worrell, 58 Utah 238, 197 P. 1043."
That defendants' Instruction No. 9 was a correct statement of the law of contributory negligence and applicable
to the facts in the case cannot be questioned. See Lawrence
V. The Denver and Rio Grande Western RR Co., 52 Utah
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414, 174 Pac. 817; Hudson v. Union Pacific RR Co., 233
P. (2d) 357; Montague v. Salt Lake & Utah Ry. Co., 52
Utah 368, 174 P. 871; Cowan v. Salt Lake & Utah Ry. Co.,
56 Utah 94, 189 P. 599.

POINT V
IT IS ERROR TO INSTRUCT THE JURY UPON
PROPOSITIONS OF LAW NOT APPLIED OR
APPLICABLE TO THE ISSUES AND EVIDENCE EVEN THOUGH THE PROPOSITIONS
ARE CORRECTLY STATED.
Instruction No. 2 reads as follows:
"The proximate cause of an injury is that cause
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred. It is the efficient cause, the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury. It may operate directly or by putting intervening agencies in motion. This does not
mean that the law seeks and recognizes only one
proximate cause of an injury, consisting of only
one factor, one act, one element of circumstance, or
the ctmduct of only one person. To the contrary,
the acts and omissions of two or more persons may
work concurrently as the efficient causes of an injury, and in such a case each of the participating
acts or omissions is regarded in law as a proximate
cause. (The sole proximate cause of an injury is
the only cause thereof. In order to have a sole proximate cause of any injury, there cannot be an intervening efficient cause which proximately contributes to cause the injury.")
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This instruction is a mere definition of a legal concept.
Assuming for the moment that it embodies a correct· statement of the legal principle, it was error to fail to apply it to
any of the facts in the case. Since it was not applied to any
of the issues or evidence the inevitable effect of it was to
confuse and misdirect the deliberations of the jury. In
Jensen v. Utah Railway Company, 72 Utah 366, 270 Pac. 349,
the trial court in its instructions gave to the jury abstract
propositions of law but made no application of them to any
phase of the case. This court conceded that these abstract
principles were correctly stated but held that the failure of
the court to apply them to any aspect of the case was error.
It pointed out :
"As a general rule a trial court should not leave
the jury to apply mere general principles of law to
a case, as here was done by the defendant's requests.
The court should give the jury what the law is as
applied to the facts either stated or assumed, and if
so found by the jury. The rule is well settled that
instructing a jury as a mere abstract or general
statement as to the law should be avoided, and that
all instructions should be applicable to evidence on
either one or the other of the respective theories of
the parties. Instructions which are not so applicable,
though abstractly they may be correct, are not helpful to the jury, are apt to be misleading and to be
improperly applied. That a proposition may be correct in a sense, and yet be inapplicable to the evidence or to the issue, is readily perceived. By the
charge, or some of it, given at the request of the
defendant, because unrestricted and unrelated, the
jury could and may have taken the view that, though
all that was testified to by the plaintiff's witnesses
with respect to the use made of the defendant's track
by pedestrians, adults, and children may be true,
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nevertheless the plaintiff, a child less than two years
of age, was on the defendant's track without right
or permission; that she had no right to be there
hence was a trespasser, to whom the defendant owed
no duty until she was actually discovered in a place
of danger."
See also:
Mehr v. Child, 91 P. (2d) 624, 90 Utah 348;
Hillyard v. Barr, 225 Pac. 1094, 63 Utah 344;
White v. Pinney, 108 P. (2d) 249, 99 Utah 484.
Rule 49 (a) clearly means that the instructions shall
apply the law to the facts involved in the particular issue.
The requirement that the law be applied to the issues is
peculiarly necessary upon the issue of proximate cause.
The term proximate cause in negligence cases is, as pointed
out by the Supreme Court of the United States in Mil. &
St. P. R. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 24 L. Ed. 256, not
"a question of sCience or of legal knowledge." It is a matter to be determined upon the facts in each particular case.
See Shaffer v. Keeley Ice Cream Company, ... Utah ... ,
234 Pac. 300.
But Instruction No. 2 does not have even the virtue of
being a correct statement of any legal proposition. If we
concede that the language, excluding the last sentence, is a
fairly accurate statement of proximate cause of an injury,
it is flatly contradicted by what is contained in the last
sentence. To say that in order to have a sole proximate
cause of an injury there cannot be an intervening .efficient
cause which proximately contributes to cause the injury, is
diametrically opposed to everything that has been said in
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the preceding language of the instruction. The two parts of
the instruction negative each other and render the whole an
incorrect statement of any recognized principle of law.
Furthermore, there was no issue submitted to the jury
to which Instruction No. 2 could be applied.
The instruction deals with the proximate cause of an
injury or injuries. We are not concerned in this case with
the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the plaintiff. There was no question but that the proximate cause
of the injury sustained by the plaintiff was the striking of
her head against the windshield of the automobile. What we
are concerned with in this case is the proximate cause of
the collision. The court did not submit any issue with respect to the proximate cause of the collision. There was,
therefore, no issue submitted to the jury to which an instruction defining proximate cause of an injury could
possibly be applied.
Even if we concede that the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury and proximate cause of the collision mean
the same thing, still there was no issue submitted to the
jury to which Instruction No.2 could be applied.
So far as proximate cause, either of the collision or the
plaintiff's injuries, that conceivably could have been submitted to the jury was whether the failure, if any, of the defendants to give additional warning of the approach
of the locomotive combined or concerted with the negligence of the driver of the automobile. This issue the
court did not submit to the jury. It never was required
to determine even whether the failure, if any, of the de-
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fendants to give reasonable warning of the approach of
the locomotive was the proximate cause of the collision
or injury. Much less was it required to determine whether
such negligence, in concert with the negligence of the driver,
was the proximate cause of the collision or injury.
We do not overlook the issue submitted in question 15
which inquired whether the jury found by a preponderance
of the evidence that the conduct of the driver of the car in
driving too fast, if he did, or in failing to keep a lookout,
if he so failed, was the sole proximate cause of the injury.
It will be noted, however, that this issue was submitted only
conditionally, and the jury was not required to determine
it except in the event they answered other inquiries in a
certain way. There was, therefore, no submission of even
the issue of whether the negligence of the driver was the
sole cause.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE
JURY ISSUES UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
In Question No. 13 the court submitted to the jury the
issue whether plaintiff's husband drove the automobile in
which she was riding into the intersection at a rate of speed
that was greater than was safe, reasonable and prudent,
having regard to all surrounding circumstances then existing, and in Question No. 14 the issue whether he was keeping
a reasonable lookout. The court also submitted in Questions
Nos. 7, 8 the issues whether the operators of the locomotive
failed to keep a lookout for automobiles crossing the intersec-
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tion and whether, if a reasonable lookout had been maintained by them, the hostler could have blown his whistle or
stopped his engine in time to avoid the collision.

~"'

:-.
·<

-·
--

-- ·

We have previously demonstrated that the plaintiff's
husband was negligent as a matter of law in approaching
the railroad crossing at a rate of speed that was excessive
and unreasonable in view of the slippery condition of the
street and his familiarity with the crossing. We have also
demonstrated that there is no evidence that would support a
finding that the train crew failed to keep a reasonable
lookout for the automobile or that they could, by the exercise
of reasonable care, have avoided the collision after they
knew or should have known that the automobile would be
unable to stop before reaching the tracks.

The defendants requested in their Request No. 1 that
the jury be instructed that plaintiff's husband was as a
matter of law negligent in approaching the crossing at an
_ excessive and unreasonable rate of speed in view of the
condition •of the street, and in Requested Instruction No. 8
requested the court to instruct the jury that there was no
_ evidence that would support a finding that the engineer
failed to maintain a lookout or that he failed to exercise
.-·
reasonable care in the operation of the locomotive to avoid
.--:·
.~·-~ a collision with the automobile in which the plaintiff was
-··
_. ~ riding.
~

Rule 49 (a) provides that when the action has submitted to the jury for its special verdict that the issues
::>: to be submitted are those which may be properly submitted
~~~ under the pleadings and evidence. The rule impliedly, if
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not expressly, prohibits the submission to the jury of any
issue unsupported by the evidence. This court has repeatedly held in cases submitted to the jury for a general verdict
that it is reversible error to submit to the jury an issue
not supported by the evidence. See:

Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P. (2d)
772;
Fowkes v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 46
Utah 502, 151 Pac. 53;
Kendall v. Fordham, 79 Utah 256, 9 P. (2d)
183;
Industrial Comm. v. Wasatch Grading Co., 80
Utah 223, 14 P. (2d) 988;
Peterson v. Sorensen, 91 Utah 507, 65 P. (2d)
12.
POINT VII
THE DEFENDANTS WERE PREVENTED
FROM HAVING A FAIR TRIAL BY THE
COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT THEIR
COUNSEL TO ADDRESS THE JURY AFTER
THE SECOND SUBMISSION OF THE CASE.
Immediately after the jury returned its first special
verdict the court instructed the jury upon the measure of
damage and submitted to them another special verdict for
the assessment of the amount of damage. Plaintiffs' counsel
thereupon addressed the jury at length on the subject of
damage. When the defendants' counsel attempted to answer the plaintiff's argument the court prevented him
from making any further argument or answer (R. 322,
323, 324). The reason given by the trial judge for his
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ruling was that the defendants' counsel had already exhausted the time allotted to him at the conclusion of the
evidence.
\Ve do not assert that the appellants were not allowed
to use the time allotted to them at the conclusion of the
evidence, nor do we contend that the trial judge may not
·in his discretion limit the time of counsel to argue the case
to the jury. \Vhat we do contend is that the court abused
its discretion in not permitting defendants' counsel to argue the question of damages. As already indicated, two
special verdicts were submitted to the jury. The first one
dealt solely with the issues of liability and did not mention
the subject of damage. After the court had instructed the
jury upon the first set of issues and the parties had argued
that matter, the court submitted the issue of damage and
gave additional instructions. There was, of course, no
opportunity for counsel to argue to the jury any matters
pertaining to special damages until the second verdict was
submitted to them. Counsel for the plaintiff was permitted
to and did argue the question of damages and was in no
manner interrupted or restrained by the trial court. In
that situation the most elementary conception of a fair
trial demanded that the defendants' counsel be accorded
the opportunity to present his theories of the evidence and
to answer the .argument of plaintiff's counsel.
To deny the defendants' counsel the opportunity to
argue the matter of damages was particularly harmful
in this case because of the manifest uncertainty with respect to the extent of the plaintiff's injuries and pain or
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suffering experienced by her. The evidence was such that
the defendants might well have contended that plaintiff
had long ago fully recovered from any injury sustained
in the collision and that the symptoms of pain or suffering
were entirely subjective. He might further have properly
contended that part of the conditions of .which she complained and part of the suffering which she claimed to
have endured were due solely to mistreatment by one of
her doctors. She testified that this doctor has placed her
in a mechanical device and stretched her neck. Another
one of her doctors testified that such treatment was the
worst treatment that could have been given to her. Not
to permit defendants' counsel to present these vital matters to the jury is to deprive the defendants of any semblance of a fair hearing. See :

Jerrell v. N. & P. Belt Line Railroad Company,
184 S. E. 196, 166 Va. 70;
Moses v. Proctor Coal Company, 179 S. W. 1043,
166 Ky. 805;
Cooper v. Robischung Brothers, 155 S. W. 1050.
POINT VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT SETTING ASIDE THE ENTIRE
VERDICT AS TAINTED BY PASSION AND
PREJUDICE AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS
A NEW TRIAL.
It is appellants' position that the jury's finding that

plaintiff was damaged in the amount of $25,000.00 is so
grossly excessive and exorbitant and contrary to the evi-
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dence that it shows clearly that the jury was influenced
by passion or prejudice. The trial court did, we submit, in
effect find that passion and prejudice tainted the entire
verdict. It should have granted a new trial.
The appellants view the law of this State to be that
where a verdict is so excessive as to be shocking to one's
conscience and sense of justice it must and should be in-·
ferred that the verdict is the result of passion and prejudice.
In such a case the entire verdict is tainted and vitiated and
should be set aside. Failure on the part of the trial court
to grant a new trial in such a case constitutes an abuse
of discretion which this court may correct.
Thus in Stevens Ranch & Livestock Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 48 Utah 528, 161 Pac. 459, this Court said:

"* * * It is quite true that, where it is made
to appear that the verdict is excessive, and that such
excess is the result of passion and prejudice, or
either, the error cannot be cured by remitting the
excess from the verdict. In the nature of things that
must be so, because every other question of jact
which is involved in the conrtoversy, and which is
included in the verdict, must therefore be tainted."
In McAfee v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 62 Utah
115, 218 Pac. 98, this Court made the following statement:

"* * * We now take occasion to say that verdicts will not be interfered with by this court on
account of being excessive unless the facts are such
that the excess can be determined as a matter of law
or that the verdict is so excessive as to be shocking
to one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion,
prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury.
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When a verdict is so excessive that it clearly indicates passion and prejudice, a new trial should be
granted unconditionally."
This Court again reiterated the above stated principle
in Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P. (2d) 123, as
follows:
"Where we can say as a matter of law that the
verdict was so excessive as to appear to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice,
and the trial court abused its discretion in acting
arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a motion for
new trial, we may order the verdict set aside and
a new trial granted. Jensen v. D. & R. G. Ry. Co.,
supra. * * *"
Appell~nts contend that the order of the trial court
requiring plaintiff to remit $15,000.00 or sixty per cent
of the amount of the jury verdict or submit to a new trial,
itself clearly and unequivocally demonstrates that the jury's
verdict was influenced by passion and prejudice and that
the trial court so found. There is certainly a point which
a trial court may reach in remitting a portion of a jury
verdict beyond which the remission constitutes the clearest
and most convincing evidence that the entire verdict was
tainted by passion and prejudice. There1 are decisions of
this Court in which it has approved a remission of part of
a verdict without finding that the entire verdict was
vitiated. In some of those decisions the trial court had
remitted part of the judgment; in others this Court itself
ordered the remission of part of the judgment. In none
of those decisions has the Court gone so far as to hold
that the necessity for re·mitting sixty per cent or more of
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a verdict did not evidence passion and prejudice
tainted the entire verdict. The following summary
Utah decisions on this quest\on, with an indication
net verdict involved in each case and the amount
rem1ssion, approved by the court.

Name of Case

Amount
of Net
Jury Verdict

which
shows
of the
of the

Approximate% of
RemisNet V ersion Ap- diet Conproved by stituting
this Court Remission

Duffy v. Union Pac. R. Co.,
218 P. (2d) 1080, .. .
Utah . . . . ............. $ 9,000.00 $ 4,000.00
Mecham v. Foley, 23 P. (2d)
497, ... Utah . . . . . . . . . . 1,000.00
500.00
Pauly v. McCarthy, 184 P.
(2d) 23, 109 Utah 431 . . . 50,000.00 15,500.00
Geary v. Cain, 255 Pac. 416 . 20,000.00
9,500.00
Eleganti v. Standard Coal
Co., 168 Pac. 266 . . . . . . . . 3,400.00
1,400.00
Stevens Ranch, etc. v. Union
Pac. R. Co., 161 Pac. 459,
48 Utah 528 . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,250.00
1,367.50
Kennedy v. 0. S. L. R. Co.,
54 Pac. 968 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,685.00
2,600.00
Baurne v. Moore et al., 292
8,350.00
Pac. 1102 .............. 17,850.00
Shepherd v. Payne, 206 Pac.
1098 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,000.00
2,500.00

44.4%
50%
30%
47%
41%

40%
27%
47%
25%

In the recent New York decision, Faubel v. Draper,
108 N. Y. S. (2d) 15, the Supreme Court of New York,
Appellate Division, squarely held that a great cut in a
verdict by a trial judge itself indicated that the entire
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verdict was a result of passion and prejudice and that a
new trial would and should be granted under such circumstances. In that case plaintiff, a passenger injured
on defendant's train, recovered a jury verdict in the amount
of $240,000.00. The trial court ordered that plaintiff remit
all of the verdict in excess of $100,000.00 or submit to a
new trial. Plaintiff accepted the $100,000.00 and defendant appealed. In reversing the trial court and ordering a
new trial, the Supreme Court said:
"The original verdict must have been the result
of 'passion, prejudice or a wrong conception of the
evidence' in view of the Trial Judge finding it
necessary to make so great a cut in the verdict to
the sum of $100,000. Consequently in the interest
of justice there should be a new trial before another jury."
Another well considered decision is Tunnel Mining &
Leasing Co. v. Cooper, 115 Pac. 901, Colo. The Colorado
Supreme Court held in that decision that a remittitur by a
trial court of nearly three-fourths of a jury verdict was itself as a matter of law a finding that t:b.e verdict was the
result of passion and prejudice. In that case plaintiff recovered a jury verdict in the amount of $38,750 for personal
injuries. On defendant's motion for a new trial under a
statutory provision in substance the same as Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 59 (a) (5) the trial court ordered that plaintiff remit all in excess of $10,000 or submit to a new trial.
Plaintiff assented and defendant appealed. The Court said:
"That right, by this provision, to grant new trials,
because of excessive verdicts, unless influenced by
passion or prejudice, having been withdrawn from
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the courts, it logically follows that when, under
this particular subdivision of the Code, it was found
that the verdict was excessive and a remittitur of
nearly three-fourths of it was required, such finding, although the iudge may have declared that he
was not able to say that the verdict was returned
as the result of passion or pre§udice, was, as matter
of law, a finding to that effect, and the verdict must
be so treated. Upon such a verdict defendant had
an absolute right, under the Code, to a new trial,
and the court had no more authority to deny it, or
disregard a portion of the verdict and enter a judgment upon the residue, than it had to deny the
plaintiff a jury trial, or enter judgment against it
without any trial at all. Still, without a verdict for that
sum, and indeed without any lawful verdict, judgment was given for $10,000 upon the mere consent
of plaintiff to accept it. That action was a plain
violation of law, because what the Code· of Civil
Procedure gives, in the situation here disclosed, and
all that it gives, is a right to the losing party to
have, and it makes it the duty of the court to grant,
a new trial." (Emphasis added.)
In Plaunt v. Railway Transfer Co. of City of Minneapolis, 97 N. W. 433, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held
that the size of the trial court's remission was itself in__._. dicative of a finding of passion and prejudice. The Court
said:

--~-:

:ni~;:

flue:::.

L~fl:

"* * * The diminution was so great that we
are obliged to infer that the court below was of the
opinion that the verdict was the result of passion and
prejudice. It certainly was if the reduction was
proper, and, if this be true, the verdict should have
been set aside altogether, and a new trial granted."
The Supreme Court of Kansas said as follows in
Steinbuchel v. Wright, 23 Pac. 560:
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"This was an action in the court below for slander. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
for $4,000. It was alleged in the motion for a new
trial, among other things, that the damages allowed
were given under the influence of passion or prejudice. In overruling the motion for a new trial, the
court found that the assessment of the jury beyond
the sum of $500 was excessive. Seven-eighths of the
verdict was voluntarily remitted by ·the plaintiff
rather than to have a new trial. In view of the
action of the trial court and the testimony in the
case, we are compelled to say that the damages were
so excessive as to show the verdict was given under
the influence of passion or prejudice. If seven-eighths
of the verdict was rendered under the influence of
passion or prejudice, the other one-eighth must also
have been rendered under like influence. In such
a c~se, the amount of damages should be submitted
to the judgment of another jury. * * *"

It is extremely significant that the plaintiff in her
original complaint assessed her general damages in only
the sum of $5,000. In her amended complaint she boosted
this estimate to $50,000, although she alleged precisely the
same injuries. The latter complaint did not intimate that
she had discovered, subsequent to her original complaint,
that her injuries were more serious than she considered
them to be at the time of the original complaint nor that
she was mistaken in any respect in her original diagnosis
or prognosis. All that developed between the time of the
filing of the original complaint and the time of the filing
of the amended complaint was some additional subjective
pain and distress. The verdict assessed her damages in
five times the amount that she in effect claimed.
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Appellants submit that the evidence shows that the
verdict was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption.
Although it is impossible for a court to arrive at the exact
monetary amount which should be allowed for each and all
~' of the elements of damage, a court may and should in a
~~ general way determine the amount that a jury could award
for an element of damage without overstepping the bounds
~ _ of reason and impartiality.
Duffy v. Union Pacific R. Co., . . . Utah ... ,
218 P. (2d) 1080.
The elements of damage and the evidence relating thereto are as follows :

-

.. ··..
--_. -

. -.
/

LOSS OF EARNINGS
The accident in question occurred on December 19, 1949.
Between that date and February 26, 1951, plaintiff worked
continuously except for a period o~ eleven weeks (Amended
Complaint). The testimony was that plaintiff worked continuously between February 26, 1951 and June 12, 1951 (R.
165). Plaintiff also worked approximately four or five
weeks between June 11, 1951 and the time of trial (R. 165166). On the basis of the foregoing facts it would appear
that plaintiff lost a total of approximately thirty weeks of
work between the date of her accident and the time of trial.
If the rate of earnings, $42.00 a week, used by plaintiff in
her amended complaint is applied, plaintiff sustained a
total loss of earnings in the approximate amount of $1260.00.
TOTAL MEDICAL EXPENSE
The plaintiff's amended complaint alleges medical expense for services of physicians, X-rays, metal brace, etc.,
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in the amount of $220.70. The evidence, 'however, would
support a finding of medical expense only in the total
amount of $206.50 (R. 112, Exhibit K, R. 167, Exhibit L, R.
168).
Loss of earnings and medical expense would therefore
be limited by the evidence to approximately $1,466.50. It
must be assumed, therefore, that approximately $23,500.00
of the jury's verdict was awarded for alleged pain and
suffering and alleged permanent disability.

PAIN, SUFFERING AND INJURY
The pertinent evidence relating to plaintiff's alleged
injuries was as follows: Plaintiff experienced no pain immediately following the accident in question but only a
stiffness in the neck (R. 159). Plaintiff described her condition in March, 1950, after returning to work as follows:
"I found I wasn't as frisky as I have been. I
found that my neck was still stiff, my headaches
started taking hold. I tired easier, more rapidly. I
just didn't feel the same at all. I started taking
aspirin. That didn't do any good, so I started taking
emperin. Emperin are temporary relief the same
as aspirin, but even they get so that I was immune
to those. I took a few codein, and then I started taking phenobarbital. It seemed like the more I took
the worse off I became. It was just a relief. There
was no let-up" (R. 164).
This description by plaintiff of her condition in March,
1950, is fairly representative of her testimony and that of
her husband throughout the course of the trial. Although it
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is suggestive of pain and suffering to a limited extent, it
clearly does not indicate any permanent disability. Although
::.:: plaintiff tried to convey the impression she had gone through
quantities of medicine, she was completely unable to show
any expenditures for same (R. 168).

Plaintiff produced two witnesses at the trial to testify
:;:: with respect to injuries. These witnesses were Dr. Reed
Smoot Clegg and Dr. A. M. Okelberry, both _orthopedic
specialists. Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Reed Smoot
Clegg on December 20, 1949 (R. 108). Dr. Clegg testified
that his clincal findings and X-ray readings were suggestive
·· evidence of a fracture in the first cervical vertebra (R. 119).
On February 6, 1950, Dr. Clegg took a radiograph of plaintiff, which showed a union of the fracture. The testimony
of Dr. Clegg would indicate no other injuries found by
him (R. 110). Dr. Clegg testified that he had specifically
advised plaintiff to wear a metal brace at all times, day and
night, and that subsequently plaintiff had advised him that
she had not worn the metal brace at all times as he had
advised. Dr. Clegg felt that plaintiff had progressed satisfactorily under his treatment (R. 113). On March 6, 1950,
:=-:· Dr. Clegg pronounced plaintiff as cured and advised her
·~::: to return to work (R. 111-113). Dr. Clegg testified that the
- averal{e time for healing an injury such as plaintiff's was
·- six weeks to three months ( R. 112) .
~·~

~

It is significant to note that prior to the time that

_...

--

,)

plaintiff went to Dr. Clegg for examination and treatment
she had gone to Dr. Holbrook who put her in a stretcher
and stretched her neck (R. 175, 176).
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On July 14, 1950, plaintiff went to see Dr. A. M. Okelberry (R. 116). Dr. Okelberry found from his examination
of plaintiff and from a reading of the X-rays taken by Dr.
Clegg that plaintiff had suffered a fracture of the first
cervical vertebra (R. 116). He felt, however, that the fracture had healed (R. 130). His prognosis was that plaintiff
carry on, with heat and massage, and wear the metal brace
which had been prescribed by Dr. Clegg as much as possible
while off work (R. 118). There was apparently no suggestion by Dr. Okelberry that it was necessary or advisable
that plaintiff, who had been working, quit work; he specifically recommended that she go on with her work (R. 131).
Dr. Okelberry saw plaintiff again on September 5, 1950.
At that time he found that her headaches were less frequent and he prescribed a continuation of the previous
treatment of massage and heat (R. 118-119). On the
occasion of Dr. Okelberry's first examination of the plaintiff, he found nothing to indicate difficulty with plaintiff's
neck other than plaintiff's own complaints of stiffness and
occasional headaches and pain (R. 136).
Dr. Okelberry had X-rays taken of plaintiff's neck on
April 27, 1951, which indicated, he stated, an angulation
between the third and fourth vertebrae (R. 120-136). This
X-ray was taken of plaintiff in a forward bent position (R.
136) . Dr. Okelberry testified that with the head in a bent
forward position the vertebrae would naturally tend to
separate (R. 137). It was his .opinion that the symptoms
plaintiff complained of might have been caused by a sprained ligament in the area of ~aid vertebrae (R. 120-121).
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On June 11. 1951, Dr. Okelberry again saw plaintiff
(R. 122). Plaintiff at that time complained of soreness in
her neck (R. 123). The following day a plaster cast was
~~:
applied by Dr. Okelberry (R. 123).
:nat 'it:
• ·
On December 3, the week of the trial, Dr. Okelberry
~
~~~· examined plaintiff again. He found no pain in her arms or
t!~~ shoulders; a good balance of her head and neck; a full
h~ range of motion; normality in the reflexes and sensation in
Jrili the arms. He advised plaintiff to do whatever she could
~:~~ and indicated that plaintiff had gone through about all the
~· 1
advice he could think of to give her (R. 125).
-1

.A.

On cross examination Dr. Okelberry frankly stated that
a!: in his recent examinations of plaintiff he could find nothing
~~ wrong with her aside from her complaints of stiffness in
1!1. ~ the neck, pain and clicking (R. 139). He testified that no
tli:r radical treatment or even necessity for additional examina~~ tion was indicated (R. 126).

::c:

There is one part of the testimony of Dr. Okelberry
which is particularly important. That is his testimony
to the effect that the worst thing that could have hap~~!
pened to plaintiff was to have had her neck stretched;
that stretching of her neck was the cause of her trouble (R.
131) . The Court will recall the testimony of the plaintiff
:;•;.: referred to above to the effect that on the occasion of her
!fJ}ml visit to a Doctor Holbrook the said doctor had placed her
il3Bfle in a stretcher and stretched her neck.

·c·8:;~

)>~

It certainly cannot be said from the evidence that
there was any objective manifestation of disability. The
large period of time during which the plaintiff worked
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subsequent to the time of the accident clearly shows that
plaintiff was not incapacitated or disabled. Neither of plaintiff's expert witnesses surggested that plaintiff had sustained
any permanent injury or disability nor that plaintiff was unable or would in the future be unable to work. Plaintiff was
Only 28 years of age at the time of trial (R. 145). Dr. Okelberry's treatment during the months of 1951 was, it would
appear, related solely to symptoms allegedly caused by a
sprain of ligaments in the area of the third and fourth cervical vertebrae. Dr. Okelberry described this condition as having been caused by plaintiff's neck being stretched too much
(R. 131). Certainly the defendant could not be held responsible or accountable for any injury caused by such
treatment.
The evidence utterly fails to show any permanent injury, much less permanent injury caused by the collision.
No part of the jury's verdict could properly have been given
for permanent injury.

PAIN AND SUFFERING
Surely a verdict of $23,500.00 as compensation for pain
and suffering where the evidence shows only occasional
stiffness in the neck, occasional headaches, and occasional
pain and irritability is so exorbitant, excessive and outrageous as to clearly indicate passion or prejudice or both
on the part of the jury. It was this very consideration which
prompted and compelled the trial court to order plaintiff
to remit what amounted to sixty per cent of the verdict
or submit to a new trial.
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This Court has recently in Shoemake1' v. Floor,
.. Utah ... , 217 P. (2d) 382, had occasion to consider the
question of excessive jury verdicts for personal injuries
under evidence of injuries far more serious and extensive
than here involved. Although the Court there held that a
verdict for $9,500.00 rendered by the trial court, sitting
without a jury, was not so large as to indicate bias or prejudice, it did in fact find that the verdict was "manifestly
liberal." Had the verdict in the Shoemaker case been two
and one-half times the size that it was, or approximately
$25,000.00 as it was in this case, the court manifestly would
have had no difficulty in concluding that it was the result
of bias and prejudice. If a verdict for $9,500.00 for injuries far more severe than the injuries involved herein is
"manifestly liberal," in the language of the Court, the
conclusion_seems inevitable that a verdict of $25,000.00
could be accounted for only and in no other way than as a
result of passion and prejudice. Under these circumstances,
it could not be cured by an order of the trial court requiring plaintiff to remit part of the verdict. Knowing that the jury verdict was tainted with passion and prejudice and manifesting this knowledge by a conditional
order which. required the remittance of sixty per cent of
the jury verdict rather than granting defendant a new trial
as requested constituted an abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court which this Court should correct.

_.....

--·;..,:

...

SUMMARY

If the~

Summarizing the contentions of appellants, we submit
that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that
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~

either of the appellants was guilty of any actionable negli-l
gence and that the trial court erred in denying their motions
for directed verdicts in their favor; that the special verdict ·~
is insufficient to support the judgment appealed from and ':
that no finding of fact can be assumed or implied in support l.:
of the judgment; that in any event, the court erred in failing . ·.·
to submit to the jury the issue of contributory negligence:
and in refusing to instruct the jury as requested by the
defendants; that the court erred in submitting issues un- j
supported by the evidence and in refusing to withdraw
those issues from the consideration of the jury; that the J
court erred in its instruction to the jury on the issue of ~
proximate cause and abused its discretion in refusing to ,
permit appellants' counsel to argue to the jury the matter ~.
of damages. Finally and without regard to the merits of j
any of the foregoing contentions, appellants submit that 1
the verdict of the jury is so grossly excessive as to manifest
unmistakably that it is the result of passion, prejudice or
corruption of the jury.

:J

I

Respectfully submitted,

W. Q. VAN COTT,
GRANT H. BAGLEY,
S. N. CORNWALL,
DENNIS McCARTHY,
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON,
LEONARD J. LEWIS,
Attorneys for Appellants
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